

CURRENT

APRIL 1961

CURRENT

THE SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL

FROM ALL SOURCES

ON THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF TODAY

75 CENTS

TO THE NEW READER

In the body of the magazine, all material to the right of the vertical rule is either direct quotation from or objective summary of the words of the author named in the margin.

The source is stated at the end of each item. For readers who would like to obtain full texts or subscribe to publications quoted, all sources are recapitulated in an alphabetical list which includes addresses, frequency of publication, single copy and subscription costs. This list begins on page 4.

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CURRENT'S DEFINITIONS

FRONTIER PROBLEMS are basic in the sense that they seriously affect our democratic way of life, relevant in the sense that they take into account new knowledge in the physical and social sciences, open in the sense that they involve unanswered questions.

SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL contains new information or new ideas or comes from an unexpected source or provides a better way of saying something.

CURRENT'S SOURCES

Current's sources of material are all-inclusive. They cover general and special periodicals; academic journals and proceedings of learned societies; books, pamphlets and reports from commercial publishers, universities, foundations and funds, citizen organizations and special interest groups; daily and Sunday newspapers, especially editorials, columns and features; television and radio commentators, interviews, forums; government and intergovernment sources; statements of opinion leaders.

CURRENT'S AFFAIRS

The phrase "new frontiers" as the rubric of the new administration was first exposed to the public by Mr. Kennedy in his acceptance speech on July 15, 1960.

How the phrase originated is the kind of question that rarely has a final answer. It is not, after all, a phrase of remarkable originality. In the present stage of historical rumor, the crucial moment is traced to a cocktail party held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on a hot night last June. There, it is said, the phrase was uttered by a Kennedy advisor in the hearing of the President-to-be; a few weeks later every headline writer had reason to be grateful.

However this historical footnote turns out, it cannot affect the indestructibility of a self-evident truth which we would like to record simply and without heat: Current, which is devoted to "the frontier problems" of the day, didn't get the idea or the phrase from the Kennedy campaign or administration. Current came first.

Our first issue appeared in May 1960. The first prospectuses were mimeographed and distributed in December 1958. They contained the phrase "frontier problems" and an explanation of what we mean by them which remains the basic element in our editorial formula. Our prospectus was circulated among men we felt were concerned with frontier problems.

We record these facts not because we seek credit for the current concern with frontiers, but because prospective readers inevitably raise the question whether we are a magazine devoted to extrapolating problems as the Kennedy administration sees them.

In stating that we are not, we do not intend to imply that the question is insulting.

During the past year, we have published the ideas of fifteen men, mostly, as it happens, unpartisan types, who have become important in the new administration. We are delighted they did. We would have hoped that Mr. Nixon would have also used men of ideas. We do not endorse the ideas of these men or of the men we have quoted who will not be working for the President. But we do endorse the idea that men who think freshly about the frontier problems of the day should be in government in positions of power. We do not believe we prove our nonpartisanship by quantitative balancing of sources. A new idea is a new idea, and if more of them come from Kennedy-people than from Dirksen-people we would be biased if we pretended otherwise.

But to return to our dilemma. We suppose the confusion will persist, and long explanations are tiresome. Therefore, appealing to Frederick Jackson Turner for the rectitude of our intentions, we will cede to the administration full rights to "new frontiers" if and when we have an adequate substitute for our phrase, "frontier problems." We will be glad to have suggestions from our readers. On to newer frontiers!

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

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MAKING ECONOMIC AID EFFECTIVE

The comparatively new international phenomenon of massive economic aid from highly developed to less developed nations is being subjected to a more sophisticated and realistic, but still sympathetic, kind of questioning than ever before. Some of these criticisms and new approaches are printed below.

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST

In a seminar on economic growth held in Poona, India, sponsored by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an economic adviser to Britain's National Coal Board discusses the effect of aid on local cultures, a problem also dealt with by India's Jayaprakash Narayan (see Current, August 1960, page 57).

E. F. Schumacher

"Economic development, and that means the transformation of whole societies, is a very big thing and, like all big things, depends primarily on movements that take place on the unconscious, rather than the conscious, level. In an Indian journal I find an article, written by an Indian, under the heading 'A Surfeit of Planning—Where are the People?' It says: 'The people for whom we plan and weave our dreams are seldom in the picture. More often they are just laborers, wage earners with little sense of participation or adventure in the India we plan to reconstruct. The reasons for such apathy are perhaps very deep, somewhere very near the soul of India.'

"The author then pleads for a 'movement of reconstruction,' rather than a plan contrived by economists, in the abstract jargon of economics, because only such a movement, 'deciding its aims and targets according to local need and desire from area to area, could gather the people, make them partners in plans which, if not very grandiose, are at least after their hearts.'

"These words, I suggest, are more closely in touch with reality than the language of (Western) economics; they point to the living source of wealth, which is the labor power of 'the people'; they indicate what I believe to be the one decisive criterion for judging the value of any development measures: *whether they will encourage or discourage the spontaneous mobilization of this labor power.* . . .

"I can, frankly, see no value in discussing such questions . . . as the ideal size of towns, the ideal location of industry, or the ideal transport system, because even the most brilliant answers to them will do nothing to mobilize the creative power of the people. Instead, I think, we should ask the much simpler and much more profound question: Why is it that the people are not helping themselves? What has come over them?

"On the whole, throughout history, all healthy societies have managed to solve their problem of existence, and always with something to spare for culture. Grinding poverty with malnutrition and degradation, with apathy and despair, as a permanent condition of millions of people, not as a result of war or natural catastrophe—this is a most abnormal and,

historically speaking, an unheard-of phenomenon. All peoples—with exceptions that merely prove the rule—have always known how to help themselves; they have always *discovered a pattern of living which fitted their peculiar natural surroundings*. Societies and cultures have collapsed when they deserted their own pattern and fell into decadence, but even then, unless devastated by war, the people normally continued to be able to provide for themselves, with something to spare for higher things. Why not now, in so many parts of the world? I am not speaking of ordinary poverty, but of actual and acute misery. . . .

"We cannot be satisfied with the snap answer that this is due to population pressure. Since every mouth that comes into the world is also endowed with a pair of hands, population pressure could serve as an explanation only if it meant an absolute shortage of land—and although that situation may arise in the future, it decidedly has not arrived today (a few islands excepted). It cannot be argued that population increase as such must produce increasing poverty because the additional pairs of hands could not be endowed with the capital they needed to help themselves. Millions of people have started without capital and have shown that a pair of hands can provide not only the income but also the durable goods, i.e. capital, for civilized existence. So the question stands and demands an answer: What has gone wrong? Why cannot these people help themselves?

"I shall venture to suggest the reply that the cause lies in the impact of the modern West upon these societies and populations. The paralysis or apathy—'somewhere very near the soul of India,' as the Indian author said—is similar to the paralysis of the Aztecs when they met Cortes and his men sitting on the backs of horses and equipped with firearms. It was not the power of the Spaniards that destroyed the Aztec Empire, but the disbelief of the Aztecs in themselves.

"I suggest that the cause of economic misery in a country like India is not the adherence to her own traditions (needless to say, there are some usages that are not true traditions but decadent bad habits; the sooner these are abandoned, the better) . . . but the turning away from these traditions, and that the cause of this turning away is the mere existence, abroad and in India, of the modern Western methods of production, distribution, administration, and so forth. M. [Bertrand] de Jouvenel says that the difficulties in achieving a 'take-off' are greater for Asian countries than they had been for the West. This is probably true, but hardly because 'the industrial revolution in the West coincided with the demographic explosion, while this explosion occurred in Asia without an attending industrial revolution.' A population determined to help itself never finds a shortage of productive tasks to employ all hands. What seems to me to be of infinitely greater importance is that the West abandoned its own traditions only as it itself developed and applied the modern methods, while the Asian countries—partly owing to European domination—lost (not all, but still too much of) their own traditions, because of something that had risen not among themselves but in the West. Thus they fell into an abyss of misery.

"To talk in purely economic terms, probably the greatest cause of poverty in an underdeveloped country today is the existence of a modern transport system. None of the developed countries ever had the task of achieving development at a time when transport was fast and cheap. No, it was only *after* extensive and broadly based development had taken place that transport became fast and cheap. To start with, every town, every village

enjoyed the protection of high transport costs—a kind of natural . . . tariff to shield it against competition from all other towns and villages. Hence it was obvious and natural that each locality should attempt to provide for its own normal and fundamental needs through its own labor, intelligence, and natural resources. Hence there arose a multitude of skills in a multitude of localities, and out of the ground thus prepared grew a middle class among which could be found the adventurers and entrepreneurs for more ambitious enterprises. All this was an organic process of growth, carried forward by individuals coming from 'the people,' not by small groups of intellectuals, educated in foreign lands, who took it upon themselves to transform whole societies and create new traditions. All these possibilities, however, are destroyed by cheap and fast transport. Village industries, thousands upon thousands of small workshops, wither away, because there is somewhere an 'efficient' modern factory which can deliver similar (though often vastly inferior) goods at a lower price.

"But is not this the essence of 'progress'—the substitution of superior methods of production for inferior ones? Does not the lower price benefit the villagers, raising their standard of living, enabling them to save and to invest and finally to accomplish the 'take-off'? Many economists argue that way, but the truth is otherwise. Because their own production has stopped, the villagers are poorer than ever before; they may be unable to pay for any of the factory goods, except by getting into debt. It has happened even that the factory itself, having accomplished its frightful work of destruction in the villages, has had to close down for lack of a market. . . .

"Economists have assumed too easily that what works best in an advanced country must be best for economic development. Gandhi never made this mistake. 'England has sinned against India by forcing Free Trade upon her. It may have been food for England but it has been poison for this country.' The problem posed by Free Trade, however, exists equally *within* a country when such a country possesses (a) a modern transport system and (b) a fringe of Western-type industries. Efficient and fast communications, like Free Trade, are food for an advanced country, and poison for an underdeveloped country. Modern economists have generally seen the 'potential' of an underdeveloped country mainly in terms of its raw material exports to the rich countries; and as such exports are obviously cheapened and facilitated by efficient transportation, they have concluded that investment in transport facilities deserves a high priority. This, I suggest, is a tragic error; it must spell general ruin unless counteracted by deliberate measures of what might be called 'controlled isolation' for a great number of relatively small communities, so that local labor will be used primarily to cover local needs.

"It is here also that the institution of money, if handled in a manner which is 'food' for advanced countries, may become poison for the underdeveloped. It is today fairly generally agreed that a country struggling for development cannot do so on the basis of free convertibility of its currency, in other words, that there must be some 'controlled isolation.' But that the same need arises *within* the country, particularly a large country like India, is generally overlooked. If no provision is made for this, then there will be innumerable occasions when useful economic activity will only be possible on a barter basis (i.e. without money) or not at all. Barter, however, is clumsy and inflexible; what is really needed is local money or script issued in accordance with local needs, as the American colonies possessed it before the War of Independence.

"These suggestions will appear reactionary and retrogressive to economists who imagine that the experience of advanced countries, where 'development' is self-generating and may even be excessive, can be applied to underdeveloped countries, where 'development' is not only urgently needed but also exceedingly difficult to get started. From so unrealistic a point of view, my suggestions must of course look retrogressive, because it is in fact necessary to go back in the experience of the advanced countries to the early stages of their own development.

"It is the impact of the West, now intensified by westernized ruling groups, which so easily tends to produce paralysis rather than the much-desired upsurge of vitality. It also produces the phenomenon to which M. de Jouvenel refers as 'technological dualism,' which represents, however, an irreconcilable division far beyond the field of technology and splits society into 'two nations' each leading a totally different life. . . .

"All the most decisive problems of development may be summed up, it seems to me, in the question: 'How can the impact of the West be canalized in such a way that it does not continue to throw the people into apathy and paralysis?' It is only when this question has been satisfactorily answered that we can be certain that Western aid—to render which we are in honor bound—will do more good than harm.

"More or better economic planning from the center provides no answer. It is only for the purposes of analysis that one can isolate the economic factor from the rest of human life. For fruitful action, the whole of man has to be recognized. If this is not done and action is based solely on economic calculations, as laid down in elaborate central plans, the only mode of action can be coercion from the top. But what shall it profit? If coercion succeeds, freedom is lost; and if it is stultified by apathy and sullen disdain, the people sink ever deeper into misery. . . .

"Perhaps the best—perhaps even the only effective slogan for aid is: 'Find out what the people are trying to do and help them to do it better.'" ("Help to Those Who Need It Most," Paths to Economic Growth Seminar, Congress for Cultural Freedom and Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, India, Jan. 21-28, 1961)

A LIFE FOR AMERICAN INDIANS

The Commission, established in 1957 by the Fund for the Republic, is headed by O. Meredith Wilson, president of the University of Minnesota. S. D. Aberle is executive director. Its recommendations are now ready. (See also Current, May 1960, page 43.)

Commission on the Rights, Liberties and Responsibilities of the American Indian

"The Indian himself should be the focus of all government policy affecting him. Money, land, education, and technical assistance are to be considered only as means to an end: on the one hand, that of restoring the Indian's pride of origin and faith in himself—a faith undermined by years of political and economic dependence on the Federal Government; on the other, the arousing of a desire to share in the benefits of modern civilization. . . .

"To encourage pride in Indianness is not to turn back the clock. On the contrary, it is to recognize that the United States policy has hitherto failed to use this vital factor effectively as a force for assimilation and for enriching American culture. As a result, Indians who have already entered the dominant society have generally disdained their historic background, drawing away from it as though ashamed. Instead of serving as a bridge to enable others to move freely between the two worlds, they have

too often interpreted their heritage imperfectly to the majority race and have proved useless in explaining their adopted culture to their own people. Only men who have a foot in each way of life and an appreciation of both can effectively lessen the gap which divides the two and thus cross-fertilize both.

"No program imposed from above can serve as a substitute for one willed by Indians themselves. Nor is their mere consent to a plan to be taken as sufficient. Such 'consent' may be wholly passive, representing a submission to the inevitable, or it may be obtained without their full understanding or before they are either able or willing to shoulder unfamiliar responsibilities. What is essential is to elicit their own initiative and intelligent cooperation."

Since 1933 Americans have been meeting their human needs in ways similar to those traditional to Indian tribes. "'Sharing' was with them a means of helping the helpless. The United States has supplied comparable relief through Social Security, and aid to the old, the blind, and dependent, crippled children, and the unemployed as well as by free distribution of surplus commodities. In other respects also, it has been extending to the entire population the kind of help formerly given only to Indians. Such things as federal financial assistance for public schools, scholarships, the construction of highways and hospitals, and medical aid to the elderly are now benefits available to or planned for all Americans. These services have come as a consequence of Acts of Congress. The Indians through the years have received theirs as the result of bargains set forth in treaties, agreements, statutes, and policies.

"As the outlook of two civilizations converges and the services to the rest of the people, financed partially or largely by the United States, actually outstrip those once given only to Indians, the movement of Indians into the broader society will be facilitated. What the members of this underprivileged race need is more and better education, improved economic assistance, a better state of health, and a more carefully designed preparation for the responsibilities of the white man's way of life. Provided that they can avail themselves of the services enjoyed by the rest of us, and also that they find material opportunities appropriate to their abilities, Indians can only benefit from a merging of the two cultures.

"An objective which should undergird all Indian policy is that the Indian individual, the Indian family, and the Indian community be motivated to participate in solving their own problems. The Indian must be given responsibility, must be afforded an opportunity he can utilize, and must develop faith in himself.

"Indian-made plans should receive preferential treatment, and, when workable, should be adopted. Government programs would be more effective if plans for education, health and economic development drew on those parts of the Indian heritage which are important not only to the Indians but also to the cultural enrichment of modern America." (*A Program for Indian Citizens*. Available through Readers Service)

AID FOR THE GIVER AND RECEIVER

The economic editor of The Observer (London) has recently completed a survey of underdeveloped areas.

Andrew Shonfield

"The grand inhibition on generous conduct in the Western world towards the poor countries is the anxiety of each of the donors about its balance

of payments. This applies most obviously to the United States and Britain, but also in fact to most of the others, including Italy and Japan. These countries, for all their impressive-looking reserves, are afraid to do anything which might tilt the balance of trade against them; if Italy, for example, handed out money to the undeveloped countries, which was used by them to buy capital goods, say, in America, the final effect would be to transfer part of Italy's reserves to the United States. It would be exactly the same as if more American goods were imported by Italy without a corresponding increase in exports. Thus any gift or loan of money to a poor country, to which the ordinary practices of international trade apply, is complicated by the danger that the way in which the gift is used may upset the giver's balance of payments with another rich country. Multilateralism, it seems, makes skinflints of us all."

In the Russian case, aid money is formally "tied to Soviet goods. The Russians contend that it would otherwise be exceedingly difficult to fit any large amount of foreign aid into their system of planning. Even in normal export trade they have always preferred the strict bilateral arrangement, with shopping lists of goods laid down in advance on both sides. . . .

"The Russian leaders would regard it as quixotic, suspiciously so, to introduce gratuitously an element of risk to the national balance of payments into an act of generosity towards the poor countries. It would be like gambling with a hungry beggar instead of giving him the piece of bread that you carry in your hand. . . . It is interesting to observe that the undeveloped countries themselves, far from resenting this Russian insistence on physical supplies, rather than aid in the form of freely spendable sums of money, seem often to feel that they have obtained some special benefit from it. They have got a solid Soviet steel mill or an engineering factory, not just a lot of American dollars. . . .

"There is a certain intellectual confusion in the West about this whole problem of aid, which will tend in the long run to make us less effectual than the Soviets. We insist on treating aid transactions as if they were simply a subcategory of normal international trade, subject to the same rules about the free convertibility of currencies provided by donor countries and the usual conventions of international competition for the resulting business. The consequence is that when we are asked to put up some money for an international aid program we tend to react in the same spirit of anxiety as we would to a proposal to let in a lot of extra imports: we are worried about finding the foreign exchange to pay the bill. . . .

"There are, in fact, various safeguards used by other donor countries besides the United States. The Germans move in with more credits *after* they have been assured that the money will be spent on German goods; the French fix it so that the aid given to their colonial territories is spent in francs; and the British have taken to using the machinery of the Export Credits Guarantee Department (a government agency) as a channel for aid to Asia, so that the credits can in fact only be spent on British goods. But all this is done in a furtive, undercover spirit, with governments trying hard to avoid any overt act which would allow them to be pilloried for the unspeakable crime of bilateralism. Everyone is officially in favor of aid freely given and orders freely competed for among the supplying nations; yet there is little doubt that the volume of aid would be less than it is now if these principles were enforced.

"Ever since the Western countries made their currencies convertible at

the end of 1958, they have been so concerned with their reputation for purity that they behave like a rich old spinster who is afraid to be seen giving presents to the man next door—for fear of what all the other rich old spinsters in the district will say. What seems to be overlooked is that the object of the exercise is not to run a competition in self-sacrifice among the well-to-do nations, but to collect the maximum amount of useful things that the poor need and the rich are willing to spare. It would be a help if the recipients of aid applied themselves more actively to finding uses for some of the things which the donors would be ready to part with on request.

"The pity is that the undeveloped countries have been so willing to enter into the spirit of this Western exercise in purity of principles, and have failed to see that" there are much larger benefits which they might obtain "if they took an intelligent interest in the pockets of surplus productive capacity that keep appearing in the industrial countries, and asked themselves constantly how they could make use of these for their own advancement.

"There is an obvious opportunity of this kind at the moment in the heavy electrical industries. With the change of power station design, leading to the use of much larger generating units in the advanced countries, Britain and other producers have spare capacity for making traditional types of electric power equipment which the undeveloped countries need. Similar situations are certain to occur frequently during a period when exceptionally rapid technological progress, as well as the frivolities of fashionable change in technical design, make machines idle and ready for the scrapheap long before their useful life has been exhausted. Again there is the instinctive emotional hostility of the undeveloped country to overcome: national pride insists that nothing which is regarded by the advanced nations as a second-best product is acceptable. Only the very latest thing will do. The truth is, however, that much of the equipment required during the early stages of an industrialization program could be readily provided second-hand—if people on both sides made a positive effort to exploit one of the assets of the advanced industrial countries that is at present subject to the greatest waste.

**Use second-hand
machines first**

"It would be necessary first of all to break down the strong prejudice which exists in the undeveloped countries against buying second-hand machinery abroad. The main fear is that something will go wrong and that there will be no help to be obtained from the seller of the machine, who will have neither the sense of responsibility nor the servicing facilities of the original maker. Besides, it is felt that to cope efficiently with the vagaries of second-hand machines and in particular to keep them operating at full capacity, in the face of an assumed likelihood that they will be subject to more frequent faults and breakdowns, must require the services of more trained technicians than would be necessary for new equipment. If this is true, then there is a strong case for a program of technical assistance to be concentrated on this problem, possibly as part of the work of the United Nations Special Fund on pre-investment. . . .

"The idea that one should try to supply poor countries with products suffering from technological obsolescence is liable to cause the kind of reaction that might be aroused by a proposal to use the United Nations to promote international traffic in narcotic drugs. But often what makes a machine obsolete in a Western country is the fact that another machine has been developed which uses less labor and the high level of wages makes it economical to replace the original one. If wages were as low as

they are in India, Mexico or one of the other undeveloped countries, no one would have thought of doing so. . . .

"There is one sphere where the high rate of technological obsolescence might offer the undeveloped countries special opportunities, and that is agriculture. In the West shortages of labor and high-wage costs have brought about a mechanical revolution on the farm, and the result is that many simple and efficient pieces of equipment, previously in use, are no longer worth producing. New ways of saving labor are constantly being discovered and new machines discarded. . . .

An International Clearinghouse

"My proposal, in short, is that the principle of mutual convenience between giver and recipient ought to be the starting point for any new and enlarged program of economic aid to the undeveloped countries. Hitherto the only place in which any principle of this kind has been openly and consistently pursued is in the American surplus-food disposal program. It is extraordinary that the force of currently fashionable dogmas about multilateral trade and free markets should have been such that this program, instead of being treated as one of the solid contributions that the West has made towards the attack on world poverty, has come to be almost a matter of apology. If the American government were less wrapped up in feelings of guilt about its failure to bring its farm program under control, it would have taken more notice of the good that it has done. . . .

"The food problem of the transition period in Asia is of a special kind; there is no historical precedent to look at for guidance. That is partly because of the scale of the problem, with a simultaneous upsurge of demand impending from a large number of overpopulated countries, all pushing forward with programs for industrial development. Moreover the industrial revolutions of the past have usually been preceded or accompanied by an agricultural revolution; indeed, it has usually been the increase in agricultural output which has made the initial development of industry possible. Over most of non-Communist Asia today the industrial revolution is being imposed, so to say, from above, and the only hope is that it will not be necessary to wait too long for the response from the sluggish agrarian substructure of these traditional societies. . . .

"However, the fortunate coincidence of the second agricultural revolution in the West—the revolution which since the war has applied modern technology to farming so successfully that there has been a rising quantity of food produced each year with fewer and fewer men working the land—offers the means of coping smoothly with the menace in Asia. It happens in any case that most of the Western nations are determined, for reasons of social policy, to keep a substantial farming community on the land and to buy their produce at remunerative prices. Since these modern farmers have acquired the knack of becoming steadily more productive from year to year, governments keep desperately casting around for new devices to curb their energies. . . .

"One important advantage of American agriculture as a source of additional supplies for the undeveloped countries is that it can be made effective at once; there is no need to wait while production is being built up. The existing U.S. stocks of food grains (estimated at 67 million tons at the end of the 1959 season) are considerably larger than the whole of a year's exports of all these commodities from all sources in the world. The Americans should indeed be encouraged to draw down these stocks straightaway as part of a concerted policy to increase the volume of consumption

resources available to undeveloped countries, who would use it to mobilize more labor and pay it a living wage. . . .

"Plainly it is possible for an international body to use and distribute physical supplies of goods made available by donor countries under the arrangements outlined above. But it would be more difficult work than dealing with development problems neatly in money terms, and then going out to shop comfortably for the goods required. The kind of management necessary would be more like that of an army commissariat in wartime than that of a bank or a business. The organizers would have to think constantly about ways of organizing the second-best, marrying what is readily available in the way of capital goods and supplies with the endless succession of needs at the other end, seizing the opportunity for making constructive use of some temporary surplus of manufacturing capacity as a particular program of investment in a developed country—it might be on the railways or in electric power or in farm mechanization—begins to run down. Or it might be that disarmament will make redundant ordnance factories and massive quantities of materials and plant designed for war purposes available for productive use. One of the incidental virtues of this scheme would be that it would bring powerful pressure to bear on the governments of undeveloped countries to think ahead intelligently about their own plans and limitations. . . .

"To make these arrangements work—either on a bilateral or a multilateral basis—will require physical planning on an elaborate scale. That will not pose any special difficulty for most governments in advanced industrial countries, who already make it their business to know where surpluses of productive capacity and labor are likely to occur in the years ahead, and engage in long-term strategic programs of investment to mitigate the social consequences. The only practical problem that is likely to arise here is that this mode of constructive thinking in physical terms is alien to most of the officials who concern themselves with international trade. . . .

"It is easy to parody this whole proposal as a policy of giving the undeveloped countries the technological leavings of the rich. The first point to observe is that the program is not intended to take over the existing forms of economic aid but to supplement them. The receiving countries should treat these additional foreign supplies of capital goods and food in the same spirit as they would treat the discovery of some valuable natural resource within their own territory—as a piece of luck to be exploited to the full in furthering the country's general economic development. . . .

"The second point is that even though arrangements are made to absorb from the rich countries those goods that they can make available with comparative ease, the citizens of these countries will not find it a completely painless operation. They will have to make some real sacrifices, especially at times of domestic boom and high employment when these supplies to the undeveloped countries—even if they are made in plants that would otherwise be redundant—have to be forced out of an already fully loaded economic system. In such circumstances the developed countries providing aid have to face a choice between inflation and higher taxes. One way or another it involves some discomfort. Indeed it should be made clear that the convenience sought for the donor countries by the system of aid tied to goods is partly social convenience, partly financial (in giving direct protection to a country's balance of payments and gold reserve), and partly the opportunity of doing a useful service at a lower economic cost than would otherwise be possible. But it is undeniable that

under this program taxes in the donor countries, or savings, will have to be higher than would otherwise be necessary.

"The main purpose of the exercise is to allow for the fact that awkward changes caused by economic pressures are occurring on both sides—in the advanced as well as in the backward countries. The problems resulting from very rapid technological change in a comparatively rich society can also be pretty formidable to those who have to suffer them. We should not adopt the attitude that because we are rich we are invulnerable, and therefore ought to be ashamed to ask the poor to help us in making our charitable enterprises less difficult for us." (*The Attack on World Poverty*)

A PROGRAM FOR ACTIVE INTERVENTION

The author of The Affluent Society, nominated to be the United States Ambassador to India, outlines prerequisites for effective economic aid and proposes a new system for administering it in future.

John K. Galbraith

"Much recent and present aid has been very ineffectually employed and for that reason has had gravely disappointing or even negative results. Without a substantial change in the whole view of economic development, the results in most cases will continue to be disappointing. The required changes will not perhaps be easily accepted here or abroad. Yet so great is the need for development and also the desire for it that we should not discount too severely the willingness to take the necessary steps.

"The prime difficulty of present aid policy is that it is based on a convenient but largely erroneous view of the requirements for economic development. . . . The capital and the technicians, together with food should this be lacking, we supply. Thus, it is thought, we contribute the missing and critical component of advance.

"The difficulty is that what we supply is, in many cases, only one of the missing and critical requirements without which there will be no progress. At least four other things are crucial.

"1. A substantial degree of literacy and that smaller number of people with the higher education and skills necessary to man a government and undertake the managerial and technical tasks associated directly or indirectly with economic advance. . . .

"2. A substantial measure of social justice. If the ordinary individual receives no share in the advance, he will make no willing contribution to it. And he can normally be counted upon to sabotage it—to be careless of the new machinery entrusted to his care or contemptuous of the new methods recommended to his attention. It is not always easy to get the individual in the underdeveloped country to see and pursue the path of his own self-interest when it involves a break with tradition. He will never do so if all the gains accrue to feudal landlords or employers or to tax-collectors, merchants and usurers.

"3. A reliable apparatus of government and public administration. Clearly, economic development can occur only in a context of law and order, where persons and property are reasonably secure. . . .

"4. A clear and purposeful view of what development involves. Development will not occur if it is believed to come automatically with escape from colonialism; if it is identified as a matter of course with faith in free enterprise or socialism; if it is regarded as the special magic that will be provided by a particular political personality; or if it is to be accomplished by some single stroke of genius such as the building of a particular road,

the settling of a particular jungle, or the watering of a particular desert. In all instances, the result—not long deferred—will be serious disappointment.

"In practice, one or more of these four factors is missing in most of the poor countries, and each is as critical as capital. Therefore, the only successful development will be that which supplies the missing elements. Since these will be somewhat different for different countries, there cannot be a common prescription for development; what works in one place will not work in another.

"These conclusions readily survive empirical test. After a decade or more of effort and expenditure, we have a right to inquire whether the countries we have been aiding are on the way to self-sustaining advance. . . .

"There will be improvement only when we begin seriously to ask what is needed—when targets are established and attention becomes focused on what is required to reach them. Then it will be impossible (or anyhow difficult) to avoid thinking about the missing elements. And once targets are established and effort becomes purposefully directed toward achieving them, we shall have measures of success—or of failure. Then, conspicuous failure will at least have to be explained, and responsibility for a wrong decision assigned. There can surely be no feature of present aid programs that is so unsatisfactory as that by which much aid brings little or no progress and no one gets blamed. . . .

"It is because we agree that colonialism left some of the countries without the requirements for independent advance that we are providing aid today. But we have not reflected on what is missing. In assuming that capital is the missing element, we are continuing to provide the one thing that colonialism provided. This perpetuates the unviable structure left by colonialism and—not surprisingly—it brings down on our heads some of the discredit and dislike which accrued to the colonial powers.

"We are face to face, then, with the disconcerting need for new thinking about economic development. . . .

A Positive Development Plan

"For purposes of designation, we may let a new system of organizing foreign aid be called the Positive Development Plan. The positive features are two: it sets achievable but firm goals for the country seeking development, with provision for measuring progress toward their attainment; and it seeks the removal of *all* of the barriers to advance in the particular country.

"Specifically, the Plan envisages a small but talented group of men assembled in Washington under the aegis of a new agency which may be called the National Development Institute. Its purpose, first, is to help countries seeking development under this Plan to establish the targets or goals which they can reasonably hope to achieve over, say, a seven-year period and to devise the steps for achieving these goals; and second, to help the government, not only to execute the program, but to develop the permanent administration required to achieve these goals and continue on the path of permanent and independent development. Acceptance of the Positive Development Plan and of the assistance provided by the National Development Institute would be voluntary, and failure to do so would not exclude a country from other aid programs. Once accepted, the United States would be committed to support the Plan and to pursue it for a specified period. . . .

"By way of more detailed illustration, a Central American or newer

A new U.S.
agency

**Targets
for aid**

African state would formally seek the help of the National Development Institute in formulating seven-year targets and the measures for achieving them. A small panel would then be constituted consisting in approximately equal numbers of representatives of the Institute and the recipient country. Working partly in Washington and partly in the recipient country over a period of six months, the group would draw up targets, determine the requisite steps and promulgate the Plan. American members of the panel would remain in close informal communication with the Institute as a way of sharing and developing experience, of checking the validity of proposals and making the most of scarce personnel resources. Again for purposes of designation, we may call the panel the Planning and Development Authority.

"The targets should be both economic and cultural. Four may be sufficient: a specified gain in national income, a specified improvement in its distribution, a specified advance in literacy, and improvement in other areas of education. A multiplication of targets—always a temptation in such planning—must be avoided, and those that are set must be capable of realization. This is subject to a measure of internal control; the targets must be consistent with the measures recommended for reaching them and these, in turn, must be consistent with the measures—external and internal—which will be available. . . .

"The only possible procedure is for the Planning and Development Authority to remain in the country in charge of development. If the Plan is acceptable to the recipient country, the Planning and Development Authority will become, in effect, a Development Ministry. Existing government agencies which have development responsibilities—in education, industrial development, agriculture, internal revenue—will become subject to its over-all directions. This arrangement is indispensable, for it is idle to set targets and not provide the essential machinery for reaching them. Yet no one should disguise the fact that on this point the proposal will encounter its most critical objection. The Planning and Development Authority, led in part by foreigners, will seem an invasion of sovereignty. Nations that have won political freedom at what seems to them great cost and peril will be quick to sense a possible threat to their independence.

"However, . . . there are certain measures of reassurance which we can provide. In the execution phase of the Plan, the chairman of the Planning and Development Authority should be the most competent national of the recipient country. And during the period of development the American members should be gradually withdrawn as trained and competent replacements become available. This is in keeping with the design for progress toward fully independent development. United Nations personnel should be closely associated with the work; perhaps a U.N. observer should be invited to be present. . . .

"Our own undertaking must also be firm, which means that Congress must accept a fairly long-range commitment to this general design. This will not come easily. However, there are features that should commend themselves to any legislator who is concerned with economy. Under this Plan, everything that is spent is purposefully directed to the goal of self-support. Resources will be used in accordance with an organized system of priorities. Tighter administration through the Planning and Development Authority could also be a source of economy.

"Finally, there will be targets and, for the first time, a way of measuring the return on outlay. There will be annual reports of progress and detailed explanation of any failure to maintain scheduled advance. Responsibility

for failure will be pinpointed. We have here the first requirement for sound economy.

"Total costs must not exceed a realistic appraisal of what the United States can be expected to spend. And this amount may set the level of the targets. But . . . the commitment must be sufficient to achieve targets that will catch the imagination and attract the energies of the country. . . .

"Under the Positive Development Plan, it is important that funds be available for those measures of social reform no less urgent than education or capital investment. As noted, feudal institutions are as great a barrier to advance as illiteracy and capital shortage, and in the long run they are probably more important. Land reform under the aegis of the Planning and Development Authority helps assure, to some degree, its practicability, for it avoids the obstacle that landlords are either unwilling to entrust their fate to arbitrary valuation procedures and uncertain compensation, or they assume charge of the operation themselves which ensures that planning never gives way to action. The Planning and Development Authority provides the hope that land reform can be done equitably, and hence that it *will* be done.

"Commonly in the underdeveloped country two powerful political forces are in opposition. On the one hand, there is the drive for modernization and advancing real income; on the other, there is vested interest in backwardness which, in practical manifestation, is usually a system of great landlords and landless tenants. The first thrust is by no means weak in relation to the second. The political strategy of development is to capitalize on it to overcome the vested resistance of the second, and to guide it into channels of orderly change. Perhaps the most serious indictment of present attitudes toward development is that we have failed utterly to find a formula for obviating this potential clash. Then, when it occurs, as in Cuba, we can react only with distraught surprise.

"No country should be forced or even persuaded to enter the Positive Development Plan. Failure to do so would not prejudice access to other forms of aid. It might be desirable if the first response were modest—one or two Caribbean or Central American countries, a newer African state—so that the initial experience might be on something of a pilot scale. . . .

Objections to this Plan will not be difficult to discover, and it is assuredly open to modification and amendment. But the ability to discover deficiencies in a proposal involving social innovation is not—in the absence of suggested alternatives—the most challenging test to which the social scientist or public official can address himself. . . . Above all, it must be borne in mind that the present procedures on foreign aid in a very large number of countries are acceptable only because we have so resolutely avoided measuring the results." ("A Positive Approach to Economic Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961)

USE STATE GOVERNMENT KNOW-HOW

Two staff members of the Stanford Research Institute contend that state governments and institutions within the United States are a neglected resource for development aid to the new nations.

William B. Dale
and
David C. Fulton

Many state and local institutions are already actively involved in the development process both locally and abroad. But the state institutional framework as such has not been tapped.

Most new African nations "have areas, populations, and economies

**Similarities in
size and problems**

which, from the standpoint of size, if nothing else, bear far closer relationship to states within the United States than they do the U. S. as a whole. Like some individual states, their economies are relatively simple, depending on only a few crops, resources or industries. Their road systems are only beginning to take form; their communications complexes are embryonic. They are struggling to make their school systems into an instrument of progress. These are all problems in which our states and communities have had direct experience on a scale which is meaningful to the new countries—and their experience covers a great many other fields as well.

"In virtually all of these countries, the problems match those of state governments more closely than they do those of the Federal Government. Thus, we suggest that logical twin relationships might be formed between the government of an underdeveloped nation and a state government in the U. S. to provide contact and help on a sustained and continuing basis. Such relationships might be financed in part by federal grants to the states, with perhaps some public and private contributions from within the states themselves.

"State-to-foreign arrangements would provide an umbrella under which a network of further relationships could be established. For instance, cooperative arrangements could be worked out between colleges and universities involving the exchange of persons and the teaching of languages. U. S. newspapers and radio stations in the relevant states could cover activities in the cooperating areas abroad. As relationships developed, it might be possible to involve private manufacturers and financing institutions as well, in a manner that would go beyond their ordinary business arrangements, while not inhibiting those of firms from other states. . . .

"Our problems with the new African nations are well-known. We are feared. They find us big, impersonal, and sometimes overpowering. Their attitudes—a matter of vital importance to the U. S.—are frequently uncertain, ambivalent, defiant. But suppose that a new African nation, let us say Senegal, for example, could form a special relationship with one state—perhaps Nebraska. And suppose, over a two- or three-year period that, as a result of aid activities, Senegal's progress became a matter of quite personal concern to the people of the State of Nebraska. The result might well be warm feelings for Nebraska and by implication, for the entire U. S. The other side of the coin, of course, is that a deeper involvement of Nebraska and other states in the overseas development process could contribute to an increased understanding and appreciation at home of U. S. aid programs—and indeed of foreign policy problems generally.

"Nebraska could send a mission of experts to Senegal. Its university could undertake a program of cooperation with theirs. Eventually, perhaps, its companies might be interested in Senegal's industrial development, at least to the point of helping in practical training programs and in corresponding with particular businesses in Senegal to suggest how problems could be approached. The State Development Commission could set up an exchange of ideas and experience on how to attract, encourage and support industry (perhaps learning something in the process). Communities in Nebraska could 'adopt' communities in Senegal, and take a special interest in their problems, their people, their progress. This kind of cooperation could extend across the whole spectrum of development needs, involving all kinds of institutions.

"This is intended to be no more than the germ of an idea, but we think it is worth further development." ("Do the States Have a Role to Play in Foreign Aid?" Memorandum, January 1961)

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

AN AGREEMENT TO SURVIVE

A British Labour Party Member of Parliament and former Cabinet Minister suggests how the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can make common cause in the United Nations.

John Strachey

"Behind, and actually by means of, all the noise, the confusion and the harshness of the proceedings in the 1960 Assembly, something has emerged which *may* prove to be the first tiny shoots of a world authority. After all, each time now that a world emergency occurs, be it the Anglo-French attack upon Egypt, or the breakdown of organized society in the Congo, the United Nations does in fact intervene. Nor are its interventions by any means ineffectual. The proof of that may be found in the vastly increased importance that the statesmen of the world have been compelled to attach to the meetings of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. . . .

"We should actually draw encouragement from the increasingly contentious character of the United Nations proceedings. When they become calm, dignified, ceremonious and innocuous, we shall know that the institution is dying. For there is not the faintest possibility of the world's conflicts being magicked out of existence. The most that we can hope for, as yet, is that they will be *expressed* within the framework of this one major world institution.

"The United Nations in itself cannot yet be more than such a framework. But if its members bring their real conflicts for expression, and even occasional resolution, to it, that is much. For the United Nations actually to become that decisive 'something more,' which we can only express by some such term as 'a world authority,' a profound change in the attitudes of its member states, and above all of its two leading member states, is indispensable.

"For at present it is undeniable that the prime purpose of the two leading member states, Russia and America, with their allies, is to thwart and frustrate each other in every possible way. It is a miracle that the United Nations has, nevertheless, achieved enough common will to intervene rather effectively in recent world emergencies. Can the explanation be that behind the still apparently single-minded determination of Russia and America to oppose each other in every possible way, there exists some unavowed, perhaps half-conscious, realization that the beginnings of a world center of authority, with power to act, may be becoming indispensable to their own survival? . . .

"It is no more than an oversimplification to say that the United Nations is, as yet, Russia and America, and their respective allies, plus an audience of uncommitted nations; true, this is an audience which the two principals find it increasingly important to conciliate, to influence and to win over if they possibly can; but still, to a high degree, it is an audience. For such an institution as this to develop into anything even approximating to an authority capable of keeping order in the world, it is indispensable

that the principals should discover a common purpose upon which they may sometimes act in unison.

"What could such a common purpose be? As a matter of fact it is not difficult to answer that question. At this stage in the world's development the Soviet and American governments can have one, and only one, common purpose; namely to stay alive. It is a simple but not an unimportant purpose. For no serious student of world affairs can doubt that unless they do discover that they have this one basic interest in common, they will both sooner or later perish in nuclear war. But if they do gradually discover the common purpose of survival they may yet unite their wills just sufficiently to enable the United Nations to keep some sort of order in the world. . . .

"May not the Russian and American governments come to realize that they actually could cooperate, through and in the United Nations, for this one purpose of survival, even while they practiced, and preached, their respective credos? Is there not a possibility that they may recognize, in time, the necessity of suppressing, by their joint action, the grosser disturbances which threaten the peace of the world? If once they can begin to do so their own disputes will, surely, fall into place. After all what vital interest of the United States does Russia in fact need to menace? Or where do American purposes and aspirations in fact threaten the well-being, let alone the existence, of Russia? True there are plenty of causes of dispute, from Berlin, to Cuba, to Formosa. But they are mostly in fact secondary, peripheral and therefore *capable*, at least, of settlement. They are capable of settlement if once the Russian and American governments come to realize that they both have a vested interest in settlements as such. For like all dominant powers, they are in essence *conservative* powers. This may be a hard saying for governments representing, respectively, the oldest and the newest revolutionary traditions in the world. But it is a fact.

"We must not suppose that a world kept in order by the joint will of Russia and America, acting no doubt in the name of the United Nations, would be any Utopia. On the contrary, the rest of us might suffer many things which we should consider injustices. But there would be, in the United Nations, at least a forum of complaint, and a world public opinion—it is visibly and audibly coming into existence already—to which appeal could be made. At all events what other possible hope for survival is there than some such gradual accommodation of the wills of the two great conservative super-powers, so that the United Nations may develop into an instrument of authority for the pacification of the world?" (*The Pursuit of Peace*, Fabian Tract 329, December 1960)

A PROPOSAL

In a statement submitted to a policy committee of the British Labour Party, former Prime Minister Attlee, Lord Longford (formerly Lord Pakenham) and Mr. Mallalieu, a Labour Member of Parliament, call for the reconstitution of the United Nations.

**Lord Attlee,
Lord Longford
and
E. L. Mallalieu**

"The content of government depends on conditions existing at the time. The most simple government is that which is concerned only with the maintenance of law and order. It is this minimum which the world requires today. We therefore desire a reconstitution of the U.N. on a basis whereby every state would have some representation; but in accordance with their population some states would have greater weight than others. It is possible

to devise such a system, whereby no single power and no contending bloc would have an absolute majority. This necessarily means giving a certain weightage to the smaller members.

"A United Nations reformed on such a basis should have power to make decisions by a requisite majority. It should have an Executive, Courts of Justice and an International Police Force at its disposal. Within this framework individual states would be free to carry on their own particular ways of life and take decisions on their internal affairs. Given this minimum there would be scope for the continuance and expansion of the other activities of U.N.—in particular the organizing of aid to less developed nations, which would be essential in order to utilize the resources hitherto devoted to the making of arms. Once this initial step has been taken, there is every probability that there would be increasing international cooperation for peaceful ends.

"We believe it is now a politically practical aim to work for world government with limited functions but effective powers." (Statement presented to the Committee of Twelve, British Labour Party, Feb. 7, 1961)

AS THE UNITED STATES SEES IT

The United States Representative to the United Nations:

Adlai E. Stevenson

"What we are attempting to do today at the United Nations is to roll back every one of these great historical fatalities which in the past have made the ending of empire the most feared, perilous condition of the survival of society. We are trying to end the dreary cycle of imperialism by which the outgoing masters are quickly replaced by new ones who come quickly in to fill the vacuum of power. . . .

"But today one thing is new. It is the United Nations effort to attempt to apply peaceful procedures and rational solutions even to the most aggravated and envenomed of political crises. On a dark scene, in a dark time of troubles, . . . the United Nations is proclaiming by deed as well as word that men can live, not by violence and brute strength, but, at last, by reason and law.

"I would say to our own American people: support the United Nations with your approbation, your sympathetic attention, your prayers. To the smaller powers, especially the emerging states of Africa, I would repeat that the United Nations is of first interest above all to the weaker states since without it they have no ultimate protection against the force of more powerful and predatory governments.

"And to the Soviet Union I would say: There are laws of history more profound, more inescapable than the laws dreamed up by Marx and Lenin—laws which belong not to class relationships or stages of economic development, but to the nature and the destiny of man himself.

"Among these laws is the certainty that war follows when new empires thrust into collapsing ruins of the old. So stay your ambitions. Think twice about your intervention. Allow the new principle of international order—the right of peoples to determine their own destiny—to operate in Africa without your presence from without.

"Do not sabotage the only institution which offers an alternative to imperialism. Do not look backwards to mankind's evil inheritance of violence. Look forward to a world where the United Nations can be the forum and the guardian of peace." (Address, New York City official luncheon, March 2, 1961)

COMMUNIST CHINA'S CHALLENGE

PEKING AS A NUCLEAR POWER

Dr. Morgenstern (see page 35) is a professor of political economy at Princeton University.

Oskar Morgenstern

"In future struggles to form alliances and coalitions, China will be in a pivotal position if it is ever allowed to grow into a major nuclear power. The course most dangerous for world peace would be if China became the nucleus of a third bloc. Should China not succeed in doing this, it will align itself with the Soviet Union—unless the latter should try to join with the U.S. in an attempt to stabilize the distribution of world power.

"If this appears at present highly unlikely, it may be recalled how quickly after the war the U.S. formed alliances with Germany and Japan. *In any situation where cooperation clearly pays, it will take place.* It will pay here, under certain conditions. Two of these three powers (the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Red China) will be driven together, placing upon the third the awesome burden of securing a deterrent big enough and sufficiently convincing to hold them both in check." Or if no combination is formed, the world might be at the mercy of three-cornered nuclear-power politics.

"It takes time to become even a minor nuclear power. China, for example, will not be a superpower for a long time to come, even though it will have a few nuclear weapons sitting around in the near future. This time of transition is crucial for the world and exceedingly dangerous for the newcomers. It is the time when the present big powers should try to stop the newcomer from becoming big and aligning itself with the big opponent. Therefore, the game is to tie the newcomer, during its early development, firmly to oneself or to try to prevent it from ever becoming a big power. This transition is comparable to the dangerous period that even the big, existing powers go through from time to time when one of them significantly increases its forces and their effectiveness. Before it has finished doing so, the other, fearing to be left behind, is tempted to stop this development by preventive action.

"When the two powers have parity at a high level of potential mutual destruction, preventive action is almost impossible; but if a newcomer is still in its infancy, that is a very different matter. However, the newcomer is in a sense protected from either superpower by the other; this protection extends only so long as the newcomer stays in the same power bloc to which it belonged at first. The dilemma is complete: China unquestionably wishes to be fully independent, nobody's satellite, but it cannot emerge without creating the gravest danger to itself and the world. All this is in strict accord with the power game as observed throughout history. The time scale is different, the dangers are infinitely greater, and the knowledge of how to cope with the problem is, if anything, less.

"Before long the U.S. and the Soviet Union will have to face the fact that the chance for a cooperative solution will slip away as China is allowed to proceed on the path of nuclear armament." ("The N-Country Problem," *Fortune*, March 1961)

NEW APPROACHES TO COMMUNISM

Deviations from Moscow, once considered highly exceptional features of a monolithic Communist world, are beginning to be regarded as the normal pattern. (See *Current*, February 1961, page 37, and March 1961, page 16.)

THE GROWTH OF DIVERSITY

Dr. Brzezinski, a specialist in Soviet affairs and the author of The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, is a member of the staff of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

"The changes that have taken place, and are continuing to take place, within the Communist world have important policy implications for the West. In analyzing these changes, we should abandon the tendency to operate in simple and extreme terms. The bloc is not splitting and is not likely to split. Talk of a Sino-Soviet conflict, or even a war between them, merely illustrates a profound misconception of the essence of the historical phenomenon of communism, which, while affected by traditional national considerations, has from its very beginning reflected a conscious emphasis on supranational perspectives. Similarly, a change within the Soviet bloc should not be viewed as presaging its disintegration or, conversely, its soon becoming one Communist state. The tendency to see the bloc in terms of such extremes simply obscures the important, if less dramatic, changes within it.

"For years the Soviet bloc was in effect an international system run by one national Communist party. Today, it is becoming a Communist camp, with the various member regimes participating more actively in the important process of defining the camp's 'general line.' The events of 1956 served to reassure the Communist chiefs that the West was either unable or unwilling to challenge their domestic power, while the Sino-Soviet 'divergent unity' achieved within the bloc meant that opportunities have now been created for more maneuver, without running the risk of expulsion or condemnation as a deviationist [see *Current*, December 1960, page 46].

"The last Moscow conference, as well as subsequent events, bears this out. The leaders of the smaller parties, as for instance, Gomulka, played a more active role than ever before and have been reliably credited with strongly influencing the Soviet course. Some leaders, like Togliatti, could afford to show their misgivings about the conference by staying away from it. Some of the Latin-American representatives offered amendments to the draft of the conference. Others, like the Albanians, could choose to defy the Soviets, even at the risk of incurring the wrath of pro-Soviet parties. . . .

"Apart from the more overt sympathies of some parties for Moscow or Peking, there are now pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese factions within most parties. Also, for the first time in the history of the bloc, the various national leaders can quietly exercise options within the bloc itself, rather than having either to choose unity, *ergo* subordination, or a split. In effect, the smaller parties can take advantage of the implicit agreement of the two major ones to disagree.

"As a result, relations between the Soviet Union and the Communist states and parties vary greatly. In the past, one pattern generally prevailed: close subordination or open hostility (*e.g.* Yugoslavia). Now, there is far greater diversity. In the Soviet-Polish relationship, state and party ties are good, while the Poles enjoy some domestic autonomy. On the other hand, East Germany and Czechoslovakia are completely subordinate to the Soviet Union, while state and party relations are also excellent. State and party ties with North Viet Nam are good despite its earlier dependence on China. With China itself there are good state relations but disagreements between the ruling parties. Finally, with Albania, there are correct state relations but apparent frigidity in party relations. . . .

"Furthermore, if Khrushchev's version of the conference can be trusted, it was the Soviet delegation which suggested that the conference no longer refer to the Soviet party as the leader of the camp. In 1957, the Soviets, supported by the Chinese, had insisted on this designation since the status of leadership helped to ensure automatic support for any Soviet initiatives. But today, as Khrushchev put it, 'the fact that we are called the leader gives no advantages either to our party or to other parties. On the contrary, it only creates difficulties.' One may surmise that the elimination of such a reference could forestall any Chinese claim to co-leadership of the camp. In fact, the Soviets might be arguing that if the Chinese want a united, militant bloc, they should respect in practice the Soviet line. Another difficulty which Khrushchev might have had in mind was the danger that the other parties could claim that the formal status of leader puts the C.P.S.U. under special responsibility to its followers, and perhaps Soviet freedom of action would be greater without such a formal designation. Finally, the status of leader implied responsibility for actions which the Soviets could not control (*e.g.* China towards India). . . .

"The absence of a formally designated leader, capable of acting as arbiter, is bound to complicate further the internal situation in the Communist world, even if abroad it makes the camp look more 'democratic.' While bringing to bear on any issue its own power, the Soviet leadership must now, to a far greater extent, anticipate the reactions of its followers, especially in view of some of the available options. . . .

"This heterogeneity involves both advantages and liabilities. By appearing less autocratic and more flexible, the Communist camp can now support more effectively the pseudo-Marxist regimes in Cuba or Guinea and encourage others in a similar direction. Thus a new type of expansion—indirect—may replace the old, direct type. Many of the new nations throughout the world are not only nationalistic in the nineteenth-century sense; they are ideologically oriented and think in social and economic terms similar to those of Marxists. They use words like 'imperialism' and 'capitalism' much as the Soviets do. And modernization, which they seek, does not mean to them political democracy. The relationship of the Soviet Union and of the other camp members to these new states is already one of courtship and not of Stalin-like domination. In this relationship, the Poles, the Czechs, the East Germans, can be of great help to the Communist cause. They civilize Soviet communism, their social and cultural level makes it more appealing, while the greater internal diversity within the camp makes communism seem less threatening to the newly independent states.

"At the same time, the new external strategy is likely to further the internal processes of change within the camp. One may increasingly expect Soviet allies helping to court a Cuba or a Guinea to seek a 'most-

**Advantages of
Sino-Soviet unity**

favoured-nation clause' from the Soviet Union, much the way . . . that Latin-American states have recently done with the United States, after watching our Marshall Plan aid going to Europe. This is all the more likely because of the new opportunities created for internal maneuvering by the various parties. And these opportunities will probably increase when China acquires a nuclear capability.

"From a Western point of view, a prolonged situation of formal Sino-Soviet unity with some degree of divergence is distinctly preferable to an open rupture. A thoroughgoing split would bode ill for the world. The Soviet Union can afford to tolerate within the camp a dissident but lonely China. Thus a break involving expulsion from the bloc could occur only if China were sufficiently strong to threaten Soviet leadership and to carry with it a significant number of Communist parties. A China capable of unilateral action could be very dangerous. The danger is no less if China should feel strong enough to leave the bloc on its own initiative. Presumably it would do so only if its leaders felt confident of their ability to go it alone and to influence the course of events more effectively outside the bloc.

"In either case, the Chinese would be in control of a significant portion of the international Communist movement. They could thus effectively develop a more actively militant line and presumably back it with their own resources. The Western reaction would necessarily involve a more militant posture also, perhaps the use of force, certainly higher military budgets. Under those circumstances, the Soviet Union would have to follow suit, lest the West gain an over-all military preponderance. Furthermore, the C.P.S.U. would inescapably be forced to condemn Western countermoves to Chinese initiatives, for not to do so would involve an insupportable loss in Soviet revolutionary prestige and probably precipitate further defections to the Chinese side. Hence, a break in the partnership would gradually push the Soviet Union toward more radical attitudes in an effort to regain leadership of the Communist camp. In a world polarized in open hostility between the United States and China, the Soviet Union could not afford therefore to be neutral, and certainly could not side with the United States.

"The most advantageous situation from the Western standpoint is one which involves a gradual adjustment of the common Marxist-Leninist ideology to the divergent perspectives of its various subscribers. The existence of the Sino-Soviet dialogue has already forced the Soviet leaders to think through what was formerly only a generalized statement that a war would be disastrous; it has contributed a great deal to increased Soviet sophistication on the subject of nuclear weapons. Unanimity is often a shield for ignorance and, if for no other reason than to argue with Liu Shao-chi, Khrushchev probably had to read some RAND studies! In his emphasis on the destructiveness of a nuclear war he has come close to admitting that a purely subjective factor, such as someone's decision to start a war, can possibly interfere with an immutable historical process. . . .

**What the West
can do**

"The changes that have taken place within the Communist world were inherent in its expansion and can be viewed as part of the process of differentiation which all large-scale social organizations experience. The West had little directly to do with the emergence of these changes, and precipitous moves overtly designed to promote splits will only push the Communist regimes together.

"The West can, however, strive to create favorable conditions for the further growth of the diversity which has developed within the Communist camp. We should, for instance, explore the possibility of recognizing

Mongolia, thereby encouraging the growth of a sense of independent statehood which almost certainly would lead to more assertive nationalism. We should re-examine critically our policy of nonrecognition of the Oder-Neisse line, since this policy helps to inhibit any Polish regime from 'playing the game' of using the Sino-Soviet divergence for the consolidation of its domestic autonomy, and instead forces it to bolster its patron and only source of security, the Soviet Union. We should encourage some of our allies to exploit more the traditional bonds of friendship which have existed between them and some of the nations presently within the Communist camp. We should continue to address ourselves directly to the Communist-controlled peoples, thereby encouraging domestic pressures for change which each regime must now consider, given the greater flexibility of the camp. Finally, we should not make concessions to Khrushchev on such issues as Berlin, in the mistaken hope of bolstering him, but in effect depriving him of the argument which he has used against the Chinese—namely, that excessive pressure on the West might lead to a dangerous war.

"We should consider all these measures, and more. But perhaps it would suffice to note that the Soviet bloc is not immune to the flow of history in the name of which the Communists claim to act. The prophets of history may be gradually becoming its prisoners—and the time has now come for the West to prod history along." ("The Challenge of Change in the Soviet Bloc," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961)

REVISED REVISIONISM IN POLAND

A former political adviser of Radio Free Europe in Germany who is now a member of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mr. Griffith has made two recent visits to Poland.

William E. Griffith

"Poland today is a country of spent passion. Apathy, hopelessness, indifference to politics, rejection of any ideology and retreat into private life dominate the scene. Even foreign observers, both those left-wing intellectuals who had hoped that Polish revisionism signaled a rebirth of 'true Leninism' and those others who thought Gomulka's coming to power presaged decisive progress towards Polish freedom, parliamentary democracy, and independence, have lost most of their hopes and dreams. . . .

"The gains of the Polish October [the revolt of 1956] may be summarized in two categories, decisive and peripheral. Of the four decisive ones . . . the most decisive of all was the collapse of police terror and the restoration of personal security and freedom of private conversation. The other three decisive gains were the partial internal autonomy of the Polish Communist party as against Moscow, the *modus vivendi* with the Church, and the collapse of agricultural collectivization. The two peripheral gains, those which Gomulka did not particularly sympathize with and which did and do not, in my opinion, decisively determine the picture of Poland today, were the drastic cut in capital investment and the springing up of the workers' councils, and, secondly, the greatly increased cultural freedom of publication and performance. . . .

"The decisive [gains] have essentially been retained, although somewhat attenuated in some sectors; the peripheral ones have been largely lost. To begin with the decisive one, the absence of police terror: although there were this last summer the first faint signs of resumption of some security police questioning of Poles concerning their talks with foreigners,

freedom of private conversation (as distinguished from freedom of public speaking and publication) remains substantially intact.

"The autonomy of the Polish party vis-à-vis Moscow also remains, in my opinion, substantially as it was in 1957. There have, of course, been changes in party policies and operations. In foreign policy Gomulka has completely aligned himself with Khrushchev, notably (with full Polish popular support) in their common anti-German policy and in Moscow's controversy with Peking. Within the Polish party Gomulka reigns supreme; factionalism is a thing of the past (as in Moscow), and the scene is dominated by the competition between various shifting groups for Gomulka's favor. What retrogression has occurred in Poland has arisen, in my opinion, primarily from Gomulka's, and not from Khrushchev's, initiative. . . .

"Church-state relations have become notably more tense than a year ago, and regime harassment of the Church is certainly on the increase. Nevertheless, the Polish Church still incarnates the *pays réel* for the overwhelming majority of Poles, and the regime (the weak and still demoralized *pays légal*) shows no signs of contemplating a complete break in Church-state relations.

"In agriculture, the 'agricultural circles' which Gomulka began expanding in 1959 have continued to grow, but so far they operate as genuine cooperatives for the joint use of machinery. Gomulka's ultimate objective in agriculture remains collectivization, but, in spite of the directly opposite tendency in the rest of Eastern Europe, it seems unlikely that the next few years will see its resumption by force. At any rate, the Polish peasants apparently do not think so; their confidence, as evidenced by the continued high price of land and horses and of agricultural building construction, remains high.

"In economics and culture the picture is one of retreat from the October 1956 gains. Decentralization and workers' self-government through workers' councils, the prime ingredients of the 'New Model' which Polish economists so hopefully put forward in 1957, have both been strangled at birth by Gomulka, and the Polish economy continues to drift in near-stagnation. . . . This drift and lack of any real improvement in the economic sector largely accounts for the atmosphere of apathy and hopelessness. . . .

"In the cultural field, censorship, varying from complete in the daily press and radio to somewhat less severe in book publishing, has been effectively restored; Polish newspapers and magazines today are again dull, totally pro-regime, and increasingly less read; foreign newspapers are less readily available; abstract art, although continuing to flourish, has been denounced by the regime; academic research is more closely controlled; and cultural exchange, at least with the United States, has been (allegedly only temporarily) limited.

"Having said all this about the public surface of Polish intellectual life, one must immediately add that the reality is far different. What is more important, it is a quite new kind of reality in a Communist country, one which may perhaps best be described as 'post-revisionist.' . . .

"Polish communism today is without ideology and without intellectuals, which it completely disregards. In contrast to its past history, Poland is now being run, without the intellectuals and even without the intelligentsia, by *apparatchiki* such as Gomulka, who are not of the intelligentsia themselves, and who are at best indifferent to the traditional role of the Polish intelligentsia, that of representing and leading the nation. . . . This almost structural frustration of the Polish intelligentsia, and particularly the in-

tellectuals, arising out of their current virtual exclusion from the actual leadership of the country, is one of the main causes of their hopelessness and apathy.

The Influence of the West

"So far the picture presented of Polish intellectual life has been essentially a negative one—i.e., what it is not. As to what it is, the major point to be made is that it has rejoined European culture. As was shown in Hungary during the thaw and, most dramatically, during the Revolution, so in Poland during the thaw and since, the intellectual and ideological trappings of communism in a Soviet colony turned out to have been an opaque film, which, once peeled away, revealed the traditional pattern of contact and interaction with Western culture as a whole. Although it neither questioned the nationalization of heavy industry, the agrarian reform, or the end of prewar authoritarianism, the Polish October, like the Hungarian thaw and Revolution, marked essentially the revival of traditional nationalist, patriotic, Western culture patterns. Since October 1956 Western influence has gone much further in Poland; its effect, both on elite and mass culture, was perhaps the most striking thing I noted in Poland this past summer. The Polish intellectual elite (like the Yugoslav) is again completely a part of European and American intellectual life. America has become the main influence on Polish social scientists; Paris remains the main source of literary and artistic inspiration. Foreign travel in both directions (Poles to the West and Westerners to Poland), plus easy access to foreign publications, have been the two main factors in restoring Polish intellectual life to its Western orientation; but once the fear and terror faded away Polish intellectuals would have returned to their Western allegiance in any case.

The appeal of mass culture

"Striking as Western influence on the Polish elite is, however, I was even more impressed by its influence on the masses, and particularly on the students and youth. It is fashionable in the West to decry the vulgarizing and levelling influence of Western mass culture phenomena, and some aspects are certainly far from attractive. I would suggest, however, that their influence within the Communist bloc, and particularly in Poland (and Yugoslavia), is almost entirely positive. Be that as it may, the influence of Western mass culture in Poland is certainly almost all-pervasive. Men's and women's dress, women's hair styles, the universal popularity of Western popular music (ranging from rock 'n' roll to the most esoteric varieties of jazz), the desire to be alone and to be let alone, the search for leisure time, the extreme distaste for any sort of organized mass demonstrations, the indifference if not hostility to any ideology: all these typical phenomena of Western mass culture are increasingly prevalent among Polish youth and students today, and are beginning to spread among some of the more prosperous workers. The adherence to these Western mass culture patterns is enhanced by the universal reaction against the 'fake' mass culture of pre-1956 Poland: the Communist youth demonstrations, the 'socialist realism' in art, music, drama, and the cinema, and all the other grey, dreary, forced aspects of Stalinist colonial totalitarianism. In a certain sense, therefore, the mass culture fetish of not having an ideology has become an ideology-substitute. In retrospect, this spread of Western mass culture patterns has been one of the most important and least recognized achievements of the Polish October, and one of the best guarantees against the regime being able, at least in the near future, to revive the dead ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The longer these mass culture patterns have to spread and consolidate, the more difficult any such

revival will be; indeed, almost all observers in Poland with whom I spoke felt that the point of no return in this respect had already been passed, and that revival was out of the question. . . .

"Finally, what of the relevance of Polish history and tradition to the present situation of apathy, hopelessness, and anti-ideological mass culture behavior patterns? Is not the contrast with traditional Polish messianism and romanticism too great? Without attempting any definitive answer to this paradox, one can point out that messianism and romanticism, risings and slaughter, are not the only tradition in modern Polish history. Certainly the final partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century produced in the next half-century a series of plots, risings, and repressions. However, even in the period immediately preceding the rising of 1863 there was developing a current of thought quite unsympathetic to any such catastrophic solution. After the disastrous failure of the 1863 rising, this current became quite naturally much stronger and led to the development of a doctrine called *praca organiczna* ('organic work'), which may be defined as economic cooperation with the Russian (and other) occupiers for the sake of industrializing Poland, while making no ideological, religious, or national compromises.

"Today the doctrine of *praca organiczna* is both easier and harder for Poles to accept than after 1863. Easier, because Russification and Russian occupation are, since 1956, less present than after 1863, and because the thermonuclear threat has removed war as a desirable means of change; harder because there is no equivalent for the late-nineteenth-century surge of industrialization to give Poles a positive and possible goal towards which to work. Nevertheless, there is, Poles feel, no other possibility. Communist ideology is dead, and the Communist party continues to hold power in Poland because Poles recognize that it is the only alternative to Red Army tanks. Authority and legitimacy remain primarily incarnated, as during the decades when Poland was partitioned, in the Catholic Church. Revisionism is dead, and the revisionists, themselves democratic socialists in conviction but with no hope of being able to put their beliefs into practice, increasingly accept *praca organiczna* as the only possible position to take.

"It is, however, neither a dramatic nor an heroic one; its virtues are those of patience and persistence rather than of courage and self-sacrifice. Now that the thermonuclear threat has ruled out the possibility of any rapid change through war, and that internally originated change seems unlikely at least so long as Khrushchev (and Gomulka) are in power, Poland looks to another tradition in its history, a tradition which helps it to bide its time, to preserve its patriotism and religion, and to wait, without exaggerated hopes or a sense of crisis, for better times." ("Warsaw Notebook," *Soviet Survey*, January-March 1961)

THE MIDDLE WAY IN YUGOSLAVIA

An assistant professor of political science at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania examines Yugoslavia's national communism (see also Current, November 1960, page 21).

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

"Yugoslavia is Communist in ideology, but in practice it has been distinguished by elements alien to Soviet communism; a measure of political toleration unique among Communist systems, a mixed economy distinguished by considerable decentralized authority, and a large degree of cultural freedom. The Yugoslav experiment deserves close attention

**The role of
workers' councils**

because it is an outstanding example of the impact of nationalism upon communism, and because its continued success may well lead underdeveloped countries—many of them seeking to industrialize and modernize their economies within the framework of an authoritarian welfare state—to consider adopting certain Yugoslav policies and practices. An increasing number of these countries have come to the conclusion that Western democracy is a luxury they can ill afford at this stage of their development. . . .

"During the past decade Yugoslavia has undergone a series of fundamental transformations. These are perhaps most apparent in the economic sphere, where the regime has established institutions and policies designed to encourage a maximum of local autonomy, democratic procedures, and communal initiative. Yugoslavia has decentralized its industrial sector, granting each enterprise considerable authority to determine its own rate of capital investment, as well as the kind and quantity of goods produced.

"The key institution in this democratization and decentralization program is the workers' council, which combines managerial authority with a countervailing degree of union responsibility in the policy-making process. Each enterprise is run by a workers' council. The council draws up production plans, determines the extent of new investment, and oversees the distribution of profits. Significantly, the councils operate with minimal interference from the federal government. To encourage expanded production and increased productivity, enterprises are permitted to produce the same types of goods and to compete with one another for the available market. If this competition threatens to become disruptive rather than salutary, however, the Federal Executive Council (the key organ of governmental executive power) may intervene and effect a settlement. . . .

"The worker in Yugoslavia is free to choose his occupation, to move from one part of the country to another, and to change jobs. There are ample opportunities for him to improve his skill and status through education and on-the-job training. Unions play an important role in protecting the worker's rights and in obtaining higher wages and better working conditions. They also play an important role in the workers' council of the enterprise. In function they resemble unions in Western Europe more closely than they do Soviet unions.

"Another striking feature of the economic system is the prevalence of private enterprise at the artisan and retail level. Though an individual may not own a factory, he may own his own shop or small business. . . .

"In agriculture, as a result of decollectivization, the peasantry has accommodated itself to the government. Again, the government hopes to win over the peasants, who own more than 75 per cent of the arable land, by demonstrating the advantages of state farms.

"These policies seem to have benefited both the regime and the individual without in any way jeopardizing the hegemony of the Communist party. But the newly expanded availability of consumer goods has led people to work harder and longer. . . . Increasingly, two jobs are necessary in Yugoslavia to enjoy a reasonably high standard of living. . . .

**A measure of
cultural freedom**

"In the cultural realm, Yugoslavia enjoys a measure of freedom unparalleled in any other Communist country. There are many publishing houses, each having authority to publish whatever it considers marketable. What this means in practice is that Yugoslav authors may write critically of a wide variety of subjects, but they may not challenge the fundamentals of the socialist system or the concept of Communist party rule; nor may they criticize President Tito. . . . Western literature is displayed in bookstores and seen regularly on private shelves. Political and economic writings that

challenge the fundamentals of the system are not readily available but may be ordered by those engaged in scholarly research.

"The 'socialist realist' art of the 1945-1950 period, characterized by the regime's insistence upon conformity, orthodoxy, and emulation of Soviet art, is a thing of the past. Yugoslav architects, painters, sculptors, and musicians frequently study in America and Western Europe and are very much a part of contemporary movements. . . .

"Rapid strides have been taken to develop an adequate educational system. Eight years of schooling are now compulsory. Anyone completing high school and desiring admission to a university must be accepted. All students are free to choose their areas of specialization; no quotas are established by the government, as in the Soviet Union, prescribing the number of students entering any particular field. Tuition is free and a fourth of the university students also receive further scholarship aid to help defray the cost of books, room, and board. Although the free tuition has created new headaches for the regime, it has opened up new vistas to those of peasant or working-class background.

"These developments—in literature, in the arts, and in education—are recent, and therefore perhaps are not so well established in the system as most Yugoslavs hope and believe. There are encouraging indications, however, that the Yugoslav political elite is convinced of the essential correctness of the present pattern of economic and social organization and does not contemplate any return to a Soviet-type system.

**A one-party
state**

"In the political realm, the record is mixed. Yugoslavia remains a one-party state and no opposition to the Communist party is permitted. But the party has increasingly removed itself from direct involvement in areas irrelevant to national security or the perpetuation of the regime. At the same time, it has encouraged a diffusion of decision-making power in such disparate areas as the workers' councils, the conduct of the universities, and the operation of social and cultural institutions.

"A crucial question, rarely raised or discussed even in private conversations, is the matter of Tito's successor. . . . After Tito's death there is the possibility that a Stalin-like dictator will emerge from the ensuing struggle for power, one who would seek to reorient Yugoslavia along Soviet lines. But most Yugoslavs tend to discount such an alternative, holding that decentralization and democratization have become too integral a part of the system. They point to the decollectivization of agriculture, the growing significance of the workers' councils, the spread of democratic procedures at the communal level, and the mushrooming of cultural freedom; they hold that no faction could reverse these developments and hope to survive. The economic-political consequences for the country would be so grave as to give rise to a counterreaction to any would-be Stalin as a successor to Tito. . . . Political fragmentation along national lines does not appear to be a realistic possibility.

After Tito?

"The post-Tito leadership will probably function as a collective executive. Initially at least, it will probably be dominated by Edvard Kardelj, the party theoretician, and Aleksandar Rankovic, the party strong man, and continue to rule along lines now in effect. The cohesiveness of the present party leadership is expected to carry into the post-Tito period. But more than this, the party will remain dominant because there is no organized opposition of any political consequence with the potential for effective leadership. The party, the military, the intelligentsia, and the managerial elite are loyal to the regime and have a stake in perpetuating the system.

"The present popularity of the regime rests not only on regard for Tito

but on the national unity resulting from Soviet belligerence. Three other . . . developments have contributed to the regime's stability and support.

"First, the organization of the state along federal lines has effectively solved Yugoslavia's most serious prewar political problem. The six federal republics—Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—were established along ethnic lines with the specific purpose of reducing, and eventually eliminating, deep-rooted antagonisms among the various nationality groups. . . . The regime's solution of the national question is unquestionably its greatest contribution to Yugoslav unity and strength.

"A concomitant of the federal solution has been the concept of Yugoslav, as opposed to any particularist, nationalism. With the passage of time a greater sense of national identity may be expected to develop, with its further strengthening of the popular commitment to the present system. . . .

"Second, there is widespread acceptance of the objectives of the welfare state, particularly in the fields of education and medicine. The principal problem centers on the rapidity with which these benefits may be extended effectively to other fields and to the entire population. The introduction of free universal education, higher wage levels, socialized medicine, and expanded cultural opportunities [has] enhanced the prestige of the regime. No longer is any serious thought given to attaining these objectives outside the framework of the existing system. The reason for this is a direct outcome of a third significant development: the growing political apathy of the younger generation.

"Yugoslavs accept, and clearly appreciate, the need to avoid political controversies that might jeopardize the stability and prosperity of the past five years. Years of war and consequent drastic changes have drained people of revolutionary fervor. Aside from a small segment of the party and the intelligentsia, few have any interest in ideological dialogues on the 'correct' road to socialism and the organization of society. The present generation is primarily interested in acquiring a higher standard of living and in enjoying Yugoslavia's current prosperity.

"It has been said by social scientists that the test of a regime's ultimate character can best be seen in its treatment of its own population. If this is true, then there are signs that the Yugoslav variety of socialism may continue to move ahead slowly, seeking increasingly nonauthoritarian solutions to its complex problems." ("Tito's Homemade Communism," *The Reporter*, Jan. 19, 1961)

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY WAY IN CUBA

An American journalist and historian (American Communism and Soviet Russia) examines the relationship of Castroism and communism.

Theodore Draper

"The phenomenon of Fidel Castro has, as yet, received little serious study. His revolution may not be the one that he promised to make, but it is for all that a genuine revolution. It is related to other upheavals in countries with similar national and social resentments and inequalities. It cannot be dismissed as nothing more than a diabolical aberration because it is not what it claims to be. It belongs to a new type of system, neither capitalist nor socialist, that emerges where capitalism has not succeeded and socialism cannot succeed. In most pro- and anti-Castro propaganda, the revolution that brought him into power is so ruthlessly distorted that his entire political development begins and ends in fantasy.

To communism
through Castro

"The serious student will seek answers to questions that the mythologists of 'Left' and 'Right' do not even ask. How could a revolution basically middle class in nature be turned against that class? How could a revolution made without the official Communists and for the most part despite them become so intimately linked with them? How, in short, could Fidel Castro promise one revolution and make another, and what consequences flowed from this revolutionary schizophrenia?

"The answers, as I have suggested, take us into territory that has been as yet hardly explored. For the Communists and the Fidelistas to meet, both had to travel some distance from their starting-points. The Communists had to make up their minds that they could win power, not against Fidel but only through Fidel. In all probability, this decision was made after an internal struggle in the first half of 1958 between the Old Guard 'Stalinist' leadership headed by the general-secretary, Blas Roca, and a more flexible 'Khrushchevite' group represented by the editor of the party organ, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Some competent observers believe that the deal was made in the Sierra Maestra before Castro took power and that all his moves have been determined by this pact. Others think that he went through a period of wavering and vacillation in the first months of his regime.

"In any case, his major decisions were made so secretly and within such a small group that even former members of his government profess to be uncertain of his commitments and motives.

"The inner history of Castro's regime remains to be told. Its main lines, however, have become increasingly clear. Fidel Castro—as much demagogue as idealist, as much adventurer as revolutionary, as much anarchist as Communist or anything else—was suddenly and unexpectedly catapulted into power without a real party, a real army, or a real program. In the struggle for power, he had put forward no original economic or political ideas and had stayed well within the limits of traditional democratic reform and idiom in Cuba. He differed from Batista's other enemies chiefly in the tactics he was willing to employ, in his faith in armed struggle and his willingness to organize it.

"But once power came into his hands, he refused to permit anything that might lessen or restrict it. He would not tolerate the functioning of a government which was not the façade of his personal rule, or of a party which might develop a life of its own. His power and his promises were from the first incompatible, and this contradiction forced him to seek a basis for his regime wholly at variance with that of the anti-Batista revolution. He did not have the disciplined and experienced cadres, the ideology, and the international support to switch revolutions in full view of the audience. Only the Cuban and Russian Communists could make them available to him.

"Having formerly collaborated with Batista (whose government once contained both Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez), the Cuban Communists were easily capable of collaborating with Castro. The 'united front' of Communists and Fidelistas is heading, as Guevara recently intimated in Moscow, towards a 'united party,' and if it materializes, Fidel Castro will certainly go down in history not as the Líder Máximo of a new movement but as the Pied Piper of an old one.

"Still, as long as the Communists need him at least as much as he needs them, further surprises cannot be ruled out; Fidel's ego may give the Communists as much trouble as it has given many others." ("Castro's Cuba," *Encounter*, March 1961)

THE CONTROL OF WAR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMONG THE N-POWERS

Professor Morgenstern, author of the recently published book, The Question of National Defense, discusses the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, often referred to as the "Nth" or "N-country" problem. (See also Current, May 1960, page 9.)

Oskar Morgenstern

"Some may argue that if susceptibility to surprise destruction is the main source of accidental-war danger, then the danger will increase when, say, Switzerland, Sweden, India, and Argentina acquire nuclear weapons. But one cannot imagine that the superpowers will ever live in fear of surprise attack from such nations; and the small nations, when they acquire nuclear weapons, will be no more vulnerable to the superpowers than they are now. Therefore this particular vulnerability relation is not likely to cause accidental war. It would be otherwise if smaller nations should arm nuclearly and be highly vulnerable to surprise attack from each other. Then accidental nuclear war—derived from fear of surprise—would be as grave a danger between such smaller nations as it is now between the two great U.S. and U.S.S.R. blocs.

"Another danger, so far absent from the bipolar world, impends: '*catalytic*' war, i.e., a conflagration among the superpowers deliberately started by a newcomer, who is outside the two blocs, by means of nuclear explosions furtively set off so that one of the superpowers would—wrongly—attribute the explosions to its rival. For example, China might like to see the U.S. and the Soviet Union fight each other to mutual destruction in the hope of remaining 'the laughing third.' The dangers of such a policy to the perpetrator are so great that it is doubtful whether high probability attaches to the event. Yet even a low probability of occurrence ought to bring the two superpowers together for the purpose of designing procedures to prevent this occurrence.

"Next, we observe that a very serious new issue arises regarding *local wars* in which smaller nations use their own nuclear weapons. At present, if the two superpowers should become involved in limited wars, using other nations as their tools, there exists also a danger of rapid extension of the conflict to the point where the superpowers may become engaged directly with their full might. But such limited wars *can* still remain limited, provided the mutual deterrence the superpowers exert against each other is really effective. But when third and fourth *nuclear* powers are fighting each other, the superpowers become involved quite differently and the deterrent against the expansion of war may fail. This might be the case with a war between Israel and the Arab Republic. Should one side alone, or both, have nuclear weapons, this might speed up intervention by the superpowers—leaving less time for political pressures, negotiations, and the use of the United Nations. So there is a definite new danger here and the limited-war problem appears in a more ominous light.

"We must examine also how the spread of nuclear weapons will change the way mutual deterrence now works. The prospect is exceedingly complex

Denmark as
casus belli

and it will be best to start with the simplest category—in which the nuclear weapons are acquired by a nation already belonging to one of the two blocs. Assume that the U.S. has unconditionally transferred a few heavy nuclear weapons to Denmark, thus giving that Western-bloc country a deterrent of its own. The quantity of nuclear weapons held by the West remains unchanged but the number (n) of countries holding them has increased to $n+1$, and this small shift alters a number of political and strategic situations.

"The difference can be illustrated by assuming a Soviet attack under two sets of circumstances. First, if the Soviet Union should overrun Denmark before Denmark had any nuclear capability, there is *some* doubt whether the U.S. would go to war for Denmark's sake in a manner that would certainly involve destruction of many American cities and the loss of millions of people. However, this might well be the only *effective* way for the U.S. to intervene. But if Denmark on its own has the nuclear capacity to destroy at least, say, Leningrad and Kiev, the destruction of Denmark may not be worth that price to the Soviet Union. The Western deterrent has then become more convincing *at this spot* because the assumed doubt about U.S. intervention has been replaced by a certainty that Denmark would retaliate if attacked. It follows that this particular Soviet aggression has become less likely. The Danes, however, would not be apt to use their nuclear weapons against Leningrad and Kiev should a Soviet aggression occur, say, against Greece, since Denmark would like to avoid drawing Russian fire. We can see then how possession of nuclear weapons may spread by the 'fission process' . . . because Denmark may not protect Greece, we have a reason for giving outright control of some nuclear weapons to Greece in order to balance the situation. Suppose that the weapons we have assigned to Denmark are placed instead under NATO control. Then the probability that they will be used decreases in the event that only Denmark is threatened; on the other hand if a NATO country other than Denmark is threatened, then NATO would be more likely to use the weapons in defense of that country than would Denmark, acting separately.

"Thus even in this simple, hypothetical case the meaning of the spread of nuclear weapons cannot be determined without considering the number and nature of the weapons, the control over their use, the alliances. It is correspondingly more difficult if the new nuclear power belongs to neither bloc or, if it does, wishes to emancipate itself. Some newcomers may have many potential enemies. Many small countries, perhaps of volatile political temperament and obsessed by great ambitions, will introduce a new fluidity into world conditions once they obtain nuclear weapons. . . .

"Nuclear powers outside either bloc (apart from such exceptional cases as Switzerland) either will be small and strictly local, but with possible multilateral enmities, or will be major powers striving to match the superpowers in forming their own blocs. A collection of many small powers is hard to organize unless they attach themselves to a big power. Nuclear neutralism is not a very likely development and the fundamental tendency toward bipolarity will remain a characteristic of the power game until such distant time when a true world government has been formed. . . .

"The world will have to learn that it faces problems that grow bigger and not smaller, problems to which there is *now* no solution in sight. Indeed, there may never be a solution—a most uncomfortable notion. There is only the hope that, living with these problems, the various nations will survive from year to year, avoid accidental and cataclysmic war, and that new

aspirations and discoveries—especially in the sociopolitical realm—may eventually transform our existence. Nothing of this sort is in sight.” (“The N-Country Problem,” *Fortune*, March 1961)

THE PROSPECT OF THE NUCLEAR BULLET

A staff member of the British weekly Tribune views the trend toward smaller nuclear weapons.

Raymond Fletcher

Ever since the 20-megaton H-Bomb was devised, the trend in nuclear arms technology has been towards the development of weapons with warheads of decreasing force. In 1958, for example, the Americans fired an atomic shell with the force of only six tons of TNT.

Since that date, all three American services have been adding a bewildering assortment of low-yield or so-called tactical weapons to their armories ostensibly for use against troops on the battlefield.

“The most ominous development of all, however, has produced the Davy Crockett. This is a missile that can be fired from a bazooka-like contraption and carries a nuclear warhead two miles. Nuclear warheads, in fact, can now be fitted to almost any size projectile. These, in turn, can be fired from almost any kind of ‘conventional’ weapon, from mortars to the eight-inch howitzer. The entire armory of a modern army can be made nuclear by a few simple adjustments. Only the rifle and the pistol remain immutably conventional at the moment.

“Yet even these weapons, it seems, are due for the same transformation as the others. For what may be called the Second Law of nuclear weaponry applies here. This is: if you can imagine it, it will be made.

“Now that californium has joined uranium 235 and plutonium as a fissionable raw material for warheads, the nuclear bullet becomes a possibility. This will have the force of about ten tons of TNT. A single rifle-shot, therefore, will be able to destroy a street and a fusillade a city. But there is no need to look a couple of years into the future (on past experience it will take little longer before we have the first nuclear bullet) to appreciate the dangers involved in the gradual saturation of NATO units with low-yield nuclear weapons.

“If war comes, it is highly unlikely that it will begin with the firing of the ICBM’s Atlas, Titan or Minuteman from America or the T-3 from Russia. Given the prevailing attitudes on both sides, neither will desire to be the first to press the ultimate button. But there are triggers to press in Europe, and if a frontier clash builds up into a battle, unit commanders may feel driven to order them to be pressed.

“No such commander can be expected to see the battle as a whole, still less to understand the ultimate significance of his orders. Battle burns away every consideration except one: your unit shall not be overrun. Yet once even the Davy Crockett is fired, and radiation is detected by the enemy, what is called the process of escalation will inevitably begin. Larger-yield weapons will be brought into action. The battlefield will widen. To check the enemy’s entry into it, IRBM’s will be fired at his communications, assembly points and so on.” Missiles with ranges of from 75 to 700 miles make military sense when Europe is conceived of as a single battlefield.

“No talk of ‘control’ or of ‘raising the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle’ should obscure the fact that as nuclear weapons get smaller the levels at which the decision to use them must be made get lower. They become, in fact, conventional weapons. And

One shot
per street

since they represent the points at which escalation into full-scale nuclear war will begin, their presence in Europe is a menace—and one that grows with their numbers. A .01 kiloton warhead on a Davy Crockett is more dangerous than a .5 megaton warhead on a Polaris.

"To list all the missiles now operational, or in process of development, would fill several pages. . . . 'The Bomb' . . . breaks down into about 100 different nuclear weapons, with destructive capacities ranging from the equivalent of ten tons of TNT to five megatons and maneuverability from the fixed site Titan (Minuteman, its successor, with only two-thirds of its height and one-third of its weight is intended for firing from rail-borne launching pads) to the eight-inch howitzer shell.

"Time steadily erases the difference between tactical and strategic weapons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were used strategically (i.e. against cities). Missiles of the same power are now regarded as tactical by NATO commanders in that they will be used against troops. But their range permits them to be used also against cities. When a whole continent becomes a battlefield the slight difference between the tactical and strategic use of these weapons disappears.

"We have come a long way since that antiquated weapon, the thermo-nuclear bomb, was all we had to fear. As the arms race continues, *all* weapons tend to become nuclear weapons. The discovery that several kilotons could be packed into a few [cubic] inches was as ominous as the first military use of nuclear fission." ("Against Which Bomb?" *New Left Review*, January-February, 1961)

ALTERNATIVES TO VICTORY

Mr. Stillman is a former U.S. diplomatic officer who has served in the Balkans and Western Europe. Mr. Pfaff is a former editor of The Commonwealth and has been a correspondent in Africa and Asia.

**Edmund Stillman
and
William Pfaff**

"We must avoid situations in which there is no alternative (save capitulation) to the use—by ourselves or by the Russians—of nuclear weapons. This would first require reversal of the American military trend toward *dependence* upon these weapons. That our forces be prepared to use nuclear arms is one thing, and very necessary; but that by their equipment and doctrine they become incapable of fighting a major action without nuclear weapons is to court the disaster we claim to fear. We require a *choice* of military instruments, whatever the costs in money or in men under arms.

"Deeper, though, is the political requirement: that we avoid giving specific conflicts ultimate value. Weapons are chosen according to the issue that is at stake. If national survival is the issue, ultimate weapons will be employed; any disaster is preferable to national extinction, and that is as true for the Russians as for us. It must be understood, as many do not understand, that this does not require us to acquiesce in every Soviet or Chinese demand that is enforced by a threat of nuclear war. That way lies inevitable disaster; the old lesson of Munich applies.

"Our responses to Communist challenges should be proportioned to the issues and should leave our opponents an alternative to simple surrender. For true victory in this struggle will lie in checking and frustrating the Russians and the Chinese so effectively as to win that day when their megalomania breaks itself on the rocks of a plural and vivacious world. The true weakness would be for us to so fail in imagination and sacrifice

as to fall back on the kind of threats that we are not really prepared to carry out. We understood this rather better in the early years of the cold war and we fought on the ground in Korea, settling for a stalemate, and we made a proportionate response to the Berlin blockade. Our more recent response to renewed Berlin provocations has been in fact a weak one—a generalized threat to invoke nuclear war, a threat that very likely would prove hollow.

"We need perspective. Not every political crisis warrants panic; not every seeming defeat means victory for our enemies. . . . Most of all, in this nuclear age, we need to understand that there *are* alternatives to victory—as we have interpreted victory. For to speak of victory—categorical victory—in such a struggle as ours with the Russians is to reject the meaning of history and politics and to commit our generation and our nation to the one unforgivable sin: the sin of ultimate pride—which is also the sin of despair.

"Yet it must be admitted too that even if we find wisdom in our policies, it may not be enough. The Communists are addicted far more than we to the apocalyptic vision, and they may make the end. Man may not prevail. But there is a virtue in decorum, even in the face of annihilation. And the next quarter century may bring means of defense as outlandish as our means of destruction. At the worst, it may be that not all of us will die; perhaps, as Arnold Toynbee has said, the pygmies in the rain forests will survive, to begin again the ascent of man.

"And perhaps there is an evolutionary curse on us, the curse of mind. There is a biological thrust, we know, toward a lethal gigantism: the brainless hulk of the dinosaur plodding inexorably, in T.S. Matthews' phrase, toward the asphalt pit, is the object of our mirth. Is it possible that man's mind is a similar lethal growth? That had we been blessed as a race we might have stopped with mind enough to build a fire, to pick and choose among flints? We did not; we have been unique; for some this may provide the springs of hope, for others only a special dimension to the tragedy." (*The New Politics*)

A CHOICE OF RISKS

Dr. Tucker, an associate professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University, scrutinizes the morality behind nuclear pacifism.

Robert Tucker

"There is surely a point beyond which most men are pacifists in the sense that they will consider the sacrifice of values resulting from the employment of force to outweigh those values which may be preserved only through force." But "in practice—when applied to a concrete situation—the case for relative pacifism is likely to be both complicated and uncertain.

"In this respect, it is worth recalling that the appeal of absolute pacifism always stemmed in large measure just from its apparent 'purity' and simplicity. Whether in its Christian or secular form, absolute pacifism subordinates as a matter of pure principle all other claims to the ideal of nonviolence. . . .

"It is unconcerned with consequences only in the sense that whatever the consequences, they cannot affect the absolute validity of the norm of nonviolence or justify any departures from this norm. . . . It is this very purity of absolute pacifism that permits adherents to ignore the uncertain and disputed contingencies marking every conflict situation and

to avoid concerning themselves with the probable consequences of pursuing alternative political strategies. Even more important, absolute pacifism relieves its adherents from the constant necessity of distinguishing among greater and lesser evils and from the nagging uncertainty that nearly always attends the act of choosing to preserve some values at the expense of others.

"The relative pacifism of those who would renounce any further dependence on nuclear weapons and, if need be, disarm unilaterally is not simply a position of pure principle. Moral principle is of course involved. Indeed, the one irreducible issue raised by nuclear pacifism is clearly a moral issue. Nevertheless, in all its versions the validity of nuclear pacifism is sooner or later largely dependent on facts—or at least on what are presumed to be facts."

It has been contended often enough by nuclear pacifists that we know the facts about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. "But it is not primarily upon these facts that the case for nuclear pacifism really depends. Instead, it depends on the possibility or the probability that these weapons will some day be used, and that if used they will be used in a certain way with certain effects. Statements of this sort, however, are not simple statements of fact; they are assumptions to which one may attach a varying degree of plausibility.

"No one can speak today with much assurance, however, about the possibilities of creating a stable deterrent system, or about the promise of arms control in the absence of political stability, or about how arms control might contribute to a stable system of deterrence, or about the effect that a nuclear testing agreement might have upon preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, or about the prospects of engaging in limited war without precipitating an all-out nuclear conflict, or about a score of other vital matters that must affect the judgments men reach.

"It should be abundantly clear by now that it is these uncertainties which so often divide reasonable men and set them at odds over the political strategies considered desirable and wise. . . . The case for nuclear pacifism does not rest simply upon unassailable facts which are self-evident save to the perverse and the blind. . . .

"The further one moves from the 'limiting case' the less forceful and persuasive the argument for nuclear pacifism appears. There is admittedly no reason why the argument should not apply to a nuclear conflict that falls far short of complete annihilation. Then we have the question: how far short? Should it apply to a conflict exceeding 100 million casualties? Or should it apply to a conflict which would involve 20 million casualties? Is the decisive criterion not simply the millions of casualties but the prospects a society might have of recovering from the effects of nuclear conflict? If it is the latter, what does 'recovery' mean? Must it be equated with the preservation of an effective political authority and the probability that within a number of years the prewar gross national product might once again be attained? Does a society ever really 'recover' from the brutalizing effect of the type of conflict we have already experienced twice in this century? . . .

"It is surely not unreasonable to estimate the consequences of renouncing the nuclear deterrent and disarming unilaterally by asking ourselves how this nation might act if the Soviets were suddenly to adopt this course, though remaining otherwise committed to their purposes. Is it reasonable to expect that in such circumstances we would immediately follow the Soviet lead? Or is it more reasonable to assume that we would do what

we once sought to do (not very successfully it is true, though the circumstances were less propitious than those we are presently entertaining) and use our monopoly of nuclear weapons to create a world order expressive of our desires and purposes? This question may prove annoying, and not only to the nuclear pacifists. Yet there cannot be much doubt about the answer. We would be sorely tempted to impose our views on a recalcitrant and unreconciled, though no longer effectively resistant, Soviet Union. Under what canon of logic or of common sense can it be assumed that the Soviets would behave with greater restraint? . . .

"It is incontrovertible that reasonable men do not hesitate and disagree over choosing between a risk and a certainty; they disagree over choosing among alternative risks. The risks of renouncing the use of nuclear weapons and undertaking unilateral nuclear disarmament are not to be weighed against the certainty of eventual annihilation. Instead, they must be weighed against the prospects that the two sides will manage to avoid nuclear conflict during the next decade or so while using this period to devise means for averting the ultimate catastrophe. . . .

"What nuclear pacifism urges is not simply that we must be willing to take risks but that we take a particular risk, one that would involve placing ourselves at the mercy of the adversary's 'good will'—or at least his sense of restraint. It may be true that if this step is not taken, the prospects for averting the ultimate catastrophe of global nuclear war are no more than marginal. Even so, the choice is not between a risk and a certainty but between risks." ("Nuclear Pacifism," *The New Republic*, Feb. 6, 1961)

Dr. Hughes is a professor of history at Harvard University.

H. Stuart Hughes

"I find it impossible to imagine a world in which each side carefully nurtures a 'weapons system' which it will never use, while its putative enemy stands watchfully by with a benevolent avuncular interest. In such circumstances, I think, life itself would begin to serve these systems: their cost, both economic and psychological, would be so enormous that rulers and peoples would eventually find the greater part of their energies absorbed in perfecting and guarding a vast establishment that served no rational purpose. Or rather, one that served a purpose so exquisitely rational that somewhere along the way its original logic had been lost." ("The Strategy of Deterrence, A Dissenting Statement," *Commentary*, March 1961)

WILL ARMS CONTROL SAVE MONEY?

Dr. Schelling is a member of the faculty of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

Thomas C. Schelling

"There is little reason to suppose that arms control would significantly reduce the defense budget within, say, the next four to eight years. This is so, I believe, even if there is progress in arms control. . . .

"The strategic consequences of the more promising kinds of arms control just do not look as though they would save money. To understand this, consider measures designed to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Take an extreme case:

"Suppose the 'ban-the-bomb' enthusiasts came across a mysterious ingredient that, if let loose in the atmosphere, would contaminate all fissionable material on earth and make nuclear explosions forever impossible. Surely there are many people, here and abroad, who would propose that we take advantage of this particular ingredient, nullifying nuclear weapons

**The aggressor's
advantage**

for all time, and who would do so in the name of 'disarmament.' They would claim to have achieved at one blow a solution of the nuclear 'nth-power problem' as well as an involuntary but enforceable ban on the use of nuclear weapons by the great powers.

"What would be the effect on the American budget? Like the Russians, we should have to spend 'more bucks per bang.' This is because we could not rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter aggression around the world. We could not rely on the tactical use of nuclear weapons to keep our participation in limited war cheap and efficient. It is quite possible that our conventional forces would be urgently increased, to an extent outweighing the cutback in obsolete nuclear forces. And to those advocating 'nuclear disarmament,' the increases in conventional forces would not necessarily contradict the purpose of their scheme. They would probably argue that they had disposed for all time of the most dangerous weapons; that their kind of 'disarmament' comes at a price; and that part of the price is an increase in the defense budget. . . .

"The example reminds us that there are many kinds of risk in the world, many kinds of war, many kinds of weapons and military forces. Measures to limit some of these may be offset, as far as military expenditures are concerned, by increases in others. If the sole purpose of arms control were to save money, this would mean that genuine arms control would be impossible unless it were so comprehensive as to limit all directions of expenditure. But if the purpose is to reduce the risk of war or the violence of war if war occurs, the fact that certain limitations might be offset in a budgetary sense does not mean that there is nothing accomplished. Such arms control is not self-defeating—just not closely correlated with the budget. . . .

"The most mischievous character of today's strategic weapons is that they provide an enormous advantage, in the event war occurs, to the side that starts it. Both Russian and American strategic doctrines reflect the urgency of attacking in the event of evidence that the other is about to attack. . . .

"There is unfortunately no concrete proposal available that promises to 'tranquilize' this characteristic of modern weapons, reducing the urgency of initiative, eliminating false alarm, and taking the advantage out of being the one to start the war if war occurs. . . .

"The very fact that modern strategic weapons are of a quick-reacting sort—that they enhance the danger of a general war which neither side intended—must serve to deter provocation. Reduce the risk of a limited war's erupting into general war, of false alarm, of misinterpretation of intent, and also of some accident or unauthorized action catalyzing a crisis and bringing about war, and the world becomes safer for limited aggression, limited violence, limited war.

"This may be a reasonable price for a reduction in the threat of general war. But it is a price. And it is one that may be reflected in our defense budget. The more that arms control succeeds in neutralizing strategic forces, the more we may have to deter limited war by the threat that we could fight it successfully. The necessary weapons, as we shall see, are not inexpensive.

"It helps to keep in mind that reliance on the threat of general war to police the world against limited aggression has been at least partly motivated by economy. Measures which reduce the threat of all-out conflict should be expected to eliminate some of those 'economies.'" ("Arms Control Will Not Cut Defense Costs," *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1961)

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

IS DEMOCRACY FOREIGN TO AFRICA?

Dr. Busia, now in academic exile as a professor of social studies in The Hague, is the former leader of the Opposition in Ghana who fled when his position became untenable. In a speech to British schoolchildren he contends that democracy can flourish in Africa, despite today's trend toward dictatorship.

K. A. Busia

"If all the new African states were uniformly authoritarian or dictatorial, it would lend some truth to the claim that parliamentary democracy was unsuited to Africa. When we look carefully at the nations of Africa, however, we see different political forms emerging or being maintained—by respective choices and not by any inherent Africanism or so-called African personality. Some of the new African states are developing rigid one-party rule, reminiscent of fascism; others are trying to maintain democratic forms based on federated regions, whilst in some others, hereditary monarchies are striving to direct the change from traditional chieftdoms to modern democratic states, presided over by constitutional monarchs. The wind of change is not blowing everyone to the same haven. . . .

"The claim that parliamentary democracy is alien to Africa is sometimes advanced by putting questions which look back to the past. Did African communities possess Western parliamentary institutions? Did they have the ballot box? Did they have opposition parties? Are not these alien institutions? The implication being that since these did not form part of African political systems in the past, their rejection [now] is justified.

"Yet this line of reasoning is not applied to all the borrowed political institutions, for some of those who profess it do so when speaking as a president, or prime minister, or cabinet minister, or party official. These are statuses and roles [owed] to borrowed political institutions. . . .

"What I find to be a disturbing feature of the contemporary world situation is the apparent lack of faith in democracy, even among those who belong to the long-established democracies of the West. . . . The emphasis which the Western world has placed on the need for raising standards of living in Africa, and the increasing aid being given for this purpose, seem to me to be eloquent testimony of the attitude of the West. The West seems to be saying to Africa: 'We see that there is much poverty in Africa. We are convinced that our technology, our skills, and our capital will help you overcome your poverty. . . . We are aware that you cannot have economic development without social change; there may be some quite drastic changes in your accepted beliefs, habits and institutions; but we believe the price is worth paying; for we have the vision of an Africa enriched by higher output and consumption.' . . .

"There is much evidence to show that on the other side, Africa responds favorably to this ardent persuasion. . . . [Africans] welcome the promise of higher standards of living, and want it quickly fulfilled, and everyone of us shares that wish.

"But when it comes to questions concerning the practice of democracy,

the West does not show the same faith and conviction. The West seems to say haltingly: 'We are not so sure; economic development is a universal need, and we have no qualms about transplanting our economic institutions; they should function in Africa; but democracy as we know it has taken generations to take root and grow in our soil; in your alien soil it may not, probably cannot even grow.' . . .

"In presenting the case in this way, I am aware that I lay myself open to the charge that I have oversimplified. . . . [But] a study of many apologetic statements made by Westerners in defence of undemocratic practices in Africa has left on my mind the impression that there is a lack of faith or conviction or vision in the free world for the triumph of democracy in Africa.

"By contrast, those who propagate communism in Africa do so with such fervor and conviction that it should cause no surprise that they are winning converts. The West should take note of this. If those to whom democracy is a precious inheritance manifest such languid fervor and lukewarm enthusiasm for it, how can enthusiastic or fervent converts be won in Africa? . . .

"It may be this has been partly due to the fear that criticism, or the stand that accepted standards of democracy in the West should be applicable to the actions of African governments, will lose the friendship and confidence of these governments. But is the cause of democracy served by accepting different standards of tolerance, or freedom, or veracity, or human rights? . . .

"Obviously, the history and culture of a people will determine and mold the institutional forms through which they pursue their democratic goals and values, and therefore different cultural patterns can be expected. But this cannot mean that democracy in one country can connote oppression, injustice, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and deprivation of elementary human rights, whilst in another country these very things will be regarded as unmistakable indices of the absence of democracy. Without common recognizable standards, without a common moral language for democracy, it would cease to be a meaningful term." ("The Prospects for Democracy in Africa," Address, Council for Education in World Citizenship, London, Jan. 4, 1961)

SHOULD THE PEOPLE INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLICY?

An author and scholar, Sir Harold has spent twenty years in the British diplomatic service.

Sir Harold Nicolson

"It is essential that international relations should now be conducted on democratic lines. The impression prevails that popular governments, in that they possess no ambition for military glory and seldom have any desire to extend their frontiers, are more pacific than aristocratic or despotic governments. This is certainly true so long as economic or demographic obstacles or pressures do not threaten the living standards of the proletariat. . . .

"Yet it would be dangerous to place too much reliance in the theory that democracies are invariably more peace-loving than other forms of government; the Peloponnesian and Crimean wars should warn us that jingoism can prove most infectious. Indeed popular democracy, even in the Western sense of that term, is subject to its own special disadvantages and illusions. Apart from the danger of premature and indiscreet publicity,

**Disadvantages of
democratic diplomacy**

apart from the possibility that democratic negotiators may seek for hurried and sensational results such as may increase their repute at home, there are certain inherent disadvantages in the democratic control of foreign affairs, inevitable though such control has now become.

"The main disadvantage is the resultant dispersal, or distribution, of responsibility. In the days when the conduct of foreign policy was the prerogative of an individual autocrat, he felt himself personally responsible in the eyes of his contemporaries and of posterity for the honorable performance of the commitments into which he had entered. . . . Now that the electorate, the mass of the people, are in fact sovereign in external as well as in domestic affairs, the sense of responsibility and the sense of honor are so dispersed as to be almost nonexistent. A popular newspaper can, without apparent loss of prestige, argue that some treaty entered into with public approval and consent is 'no longer applicable' merely because its execution has become inconvenient. Democracy has small sense of guilt in such matters, since it can always transfer the blame to someone else. . . .

"A second disadvantage of democratic diplomacy is the really astonishing forgetfulness of the public mind. At the time of the Suez crisis, for instance, there were many decent people in Great Britain who would have repudiated hotly any suggestion that their government was justified in violating treaties, yet who had entirely forgotten the Charter of the United Nations and did not realize that our action was as flagrant a violation of the Charter as could possibly be conceived. Not remembering the solemn pledges into which we had entered, they were quite honestly unaware that we had behaved dishonestly. They sincerely believed that their government was defending national honor, and never realized until too late that in fact our reputation was being trailed in the dust of Port Said.

"The charge of ignorance that is so often brought against democracy is not to my mind as important as the imputations of irresponsibility and forgetfulness. It does not matter over much if an elector is under the impression that Saigon is the capital of Afghanistan, since there are experts present who will always be in a position to correct this error. What does matter is that the ordinary citizen should feel that his own moral responsibility is in no way involved by the actions of his government, or that he should fail to recollect the treaties and commitments by which his country is bound.

"A further defect in the democratic control of foreign policy is that the ordinary elector is apt to take a self-centered view of international affairs. He is apt to interpret the comforting phrase 'collective security' as meaning that other countries will rush to his assistance if ever he gets into trouble, whereas when other countries get into trouble he need not move a foot or a hand to help them. . . . The ordinary citizen is often in fact unwilling to make personal sacrifices in the cause of world security; the former seem to him immediate impositions, the latter 'a far-off divine event.' The wonderful unselfishness of the Americans in contributing to world order is a shining exception to ordinary human conduct; it may be due to the strength of their missionary spirit. The ordinary Britisher's sense of mission is today less acute." (*Perspectives on Peace: A Discourse, Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960*)

A former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize.

Lester B. Pearson

"Public opinion, as expressed in press, radio, television, and in legislative assemblies, has a very much greater influence on foreign policy and diplo-

Salvador
de Madariaga

macy today than in the past. In the operation of modern media of mass communications which now do so much to determine public opinion, there is much that is deplorable. It is foolish, however, to act as if these media can be exorcized, or to assume that their abuses are normal and inevitable. The diplomat must accept easy communication of ideas as a fact of contemporary democratic life. He must realize that public discussion of important issues of foreign policy, confused though it may often be, can help to probe those issues in a way which will facilitate their final resolution. . . .

"The new techniques of public relations in diplomacy should not be scorned or rejected. They should be accepted and improved. The press officer and the press communiqué are here to stay. . . . The public, and those who inform it, must in their turn recognize the right of diplomats at certain stages to negotiate in private.

"The aims of a negotiation must always be made public in advance, however, even when the tactics should remain secret. The line between what the public should know about details and what cannot be revealed is never easy to define, particularly now that such things as military logistics and scientific data are inextricably involved in decisions of foreign policy. We are also inhibited in resolving this problem by the fact that the Communist governments are under no similar pressure to give any factual information to their public. Our own frankness can therefore be a handicap. Nevertheless, the processes of democratic diplomacy must provide for honest and extensive information to the public. Diplomats must be ready to make the most of this, rather than resent it." ("The New Face of Diplomacy," *Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960*)

THE IMPACT OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION

Ambassador de Madariaga, Spanish refugee diplomatist, assesses the effect of public opinion on the course of world events.

"In the days of old, not so very old at that, 'foreign' policy was the privilege of the selected few. Diplomats and a handful of the politicians of each nation wove and unwove the nets of foreign relations. The public followed their activities with but a distracted eye. It was easy to bamboozle any public opinion into believing almost anything by at most a few articles in the press. . . .

"Public opinion is far more awake nowadays. Even in backward nations. It may not always be enlightened; but it is alive to the issues. And, what is even more to the point, it is alive not merely to issues directly concerning the nation, but to all issues abroad as well, thereby revealing a sound instinct for moral solidarity and world unity. This fact became clear during the Suez and Budapest crises to such an extent that General Keightley, the British Commander-in-Chief for the Suez operations, in his report to his government after the event, concluded that henceforth public opinion must be counted as an important military factor.

"It will be remembered that the Suez and Budapest crises broke upon the world simultaneously and that public opinion, not merely national but world public opinion, forced Britain and France to give up that enterprise, while the invasion and murder of Hungary proceeded to their inexorable end. Nevertheless, from our point of view the difference is far less material than meets the eye; for even the Soviet Union had to pretend that her tanks had been called in by the Hungarian Government, and not by Mr. Kádár's, whom everybody knew and knows to be a Soviet agent,

but by Mr. Nagy's, who was at the time trying to bring about a compromise solution. Now this imposture was put in circulation by the Soviet Government not merely for Western consumption but for the benefit of its own public opinion. This proves that the world is nowadays governed to a considerable extent by public opinion; and that the Khrushchevs and Francos who cannot hope to gain approval from their public opinions have no other way out than to keep them as ignorant of the facts as the efficiency of their machines thereto allows.

"Even so truth will out and it will ooze in. And as for world affairs, events have a definite tendency to prove that public opinion can paralyze a show of force. . . .

"But the most dramatic case of public opinion victorious may well be the very force that keeps the world safe from the Red Army. Without in any way detracting from the deterrent value of the nuclear weapons and the intercontinental missiles, it is safe to assert that the most effective deterrent against a Soviet invasion of the west of Europe is no other than the state of public opinion in that part of the continent which the Soviet Union already occupies. At the first shot of European war, the whole of Eastern Europe would rise against her tyrants. If the Soviet Union entertained any doubts on the matter they would surely have been dispelled by the risings in East Berlin, Poznan, and Budapest, and the reception given to Mr. Nixon by the people of Warsaw.

"If the best definition of democracy is *government by public opinion*, all that precedes amounts to saying that the world has become one big democracy. Our conclusion would then be, again, that since the world community has become a world commonwealth it must be governed as such." ("Blueprint for a World Commonwealth," *Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960*)

A CITIZENS CORPS FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) is chairman of the Senate subcommittee exploring the ways of recruiting competent executives for temporary work in the government.

"The problem is this: How to make the quality of appointments of private citizens to national service keep pace with the spiraling complexity and difficulty of foreign policy and defense problems. . . .

"The causes of the problem are many. Some are deeply rooted in the traditions of our society. Others include the adverse and unintended side effects of laws and rules aimed at desirable objectives. One such example is the body of conflict of interest restraints, designed to protect the government against the use of public office for private gain. . . . These laws are disjointed, overlapping, ambiguous, and improperly focused. They are anachronistic—addressed in many respects more to the problems of the 1860's than the 1960's."

Any overhaul of the conflict of interest statutes should take into consideration the sharp increase in the government's use of the part-time consultant. Existing law makes it difficult to employ such experts. For example, the statutes prohibiting outside compensation for government employees, if enforced, would compel a consultant working for the government a week or two a year to sever his relations with his regular business or profession. Since this is hardly practical, the legal restriction is overlooked in practice.

"The lawyer-adviser perhaps works for the government no more than a week or two a year, and he obviously cannot be expected to resign from his private practice. But the conflict of interest consequences for him, and for his partners also, are now the same as if he worked for the government full time. Little wonder in these circumstances that lawyers by the score are forced to decline consultancies. . . .

"The person in midcareer is in many ways the private citizen whose services the government needs the most. He may be in his late thirties or forties. He is at the very height of his vigor and powers. He is bold and innovative.

"Yet the midcareer official, so much needed by the government, is also generally the hardest to get. The relative sacrifices required of him in accepting a government post may be of a different order of magnitude from those demanded of a successful executive nearing retirement age. . . .

"He may be at the point where he can least afford additional expenses or a reduction of income. He may also be at the make or break stage in his profession. The prospect of leaving his regular employer at this juncture, and losing money in the process, is often for him simply out of the question. . . .

"Actually, there is considerable evidence that the job a middle-ranking executive takes when he leaves the government is often considerably better than the one he had before entering it. The problem of losing out in his regular employment, however, cannot be lightly dismissed. Especially in the case of a single proprietorship, a private professional practice, or a small company, it is extremely difficult to argue persuasively for an extended tour of duty in Washington.

"Any improvement of this situation depends primarily upon employers—not the government. They—whether universities, business enterprises, labor organizations, or professional firms—must come to realize that they will periodically be called upon to contribute to the nation's security by releasing some of their best personnel for national service, and welcoming them back. And the case can rest upon more than patriotism. In many cases, the employer profits from the new skills and perspectives acquired through government work.

"For the person in midcareer, the problem may be a simple matter of cash. Relatively small amounts of money may be decisive in resolving the issue for or against government service. [One government expert] told the subcommittee that \$20 million annually, prudently applied to adjustments in the top salary grades, would make it dramatically easier for the government to enlist the help of private citizens, and to retain outstanding career officials in its service.

"Another practical step, costing extremely little, would be to defray more of the out-of-pocket expenses normally incurred by those accepting government assignments of limited duration. These consist of moving bills and the like. Unlike private employers, the government does not pay for legitimate expenses so incurred. It should. The administrative problem of preventing abuses is certainly not insuperable.

"The recruiting of citizens for top national security posts has normally proceeded in a way too casual to be satisfactory. Lists of prospective nominees are often haphazardly compiled; the element of chance—the accidental phone call, the unexpected encounter—heavily colors the selection process; agencies engage in competitive bidding for talent; forward planning is rare." ("The Private Citizen and the National Service," Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, Feb. 28, 1961)

MAN'S RELATIONS TO MAN

CAN INTERGROUP QUOTAS BE JUSTIFIED?

The director of New York University's Center for Human Relations and Community Studies questions the "benign" quota.

Dan W. Dodson

"For those concerned with intergroup relations, one of the most baffling problems is that of engineering desegregation programs so that ratios among different peoples are maintained in such proportions that the weight of numbers of one group does not constitute a threat to the other. Most would concede that there is a relation between the proportion of those to be integrated and the prospects for successfully stabilizing relations in the desegregated groups. 'We are not too sure what other factors are involved, however.

"In the high school situation in New York City the experience seems to be that, as the percentage of Negroes in the student population approaches 30, the white group starts to withdraw *en masse*. When the white pupils start withdrawing, the better students of the Negro group also leave, so that the school is left with a greatly reduced student body, frequently composed of youngsters with various problems of adjustment. . . .

"At the neighborhood level, the elementary schools make out better. Here proportions of Negroes to whites seem to make little difference up to and well beyond the 50 per cent point. . . .

"A theory of benign quotas is being tested in residential housing by the Milgram associates in their projects. The assumption is that whites do not mind living with Negro neighbors provided they can be assured that the values of the dominant group will not be 'drowned' by the number of Negroes. Hence there is a consciously established quota system in which some houses are held off the white market to assure that some Negroes are accommodated. . . .

"In New York City, as in many other communities, the question is asked increasingly: what can be done with public housing to keep it integrated? . . . What should be the responsibility of the public authority to seek eligible continental whites to move into the projects to help maintain interracial balances? . . .

"These are illustrative of the issues before us today as we wrestle with the problems of desegregation. The problem is not new, either in philosophy or practice. What is new is the changing relationship of groups to each other.

"The basic philosophy of intergroup relations in crashing through institutionalized segregation and *apartheid* policies was most clearly stated by Justice Harlan in the famous *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision. In his dissent he stated that any arm of government in dealing with people should be 'color blind.' . . .

"In this first phase of desegregation, Harlan's statement and the phraseology of the law [have] been of tremendous importance. In New York City the first housing authority administrator was able to get integrated housing because he said: 'This is public housing. Being public it is available

Questions for quotas

to all the public who qualify, without regard to race, creed or color.' In a like measure the laws against discrimination have said: 'You do not have to employ a man on any other basis than before, except that race, creed or color shall not be a factor in determining his qualifications.'

"Today, however, when it comes to integration as contrasted to desegregation, the shoe is on the other foot. The Supreme Court decision in May 1954 can be, and is, widely interpreted to mean that children reared in segregation are traumatized in their perception of self. This has injected a new value into the picture. This value indicates that when segregation, either enforced or *de facto*, occurs it is the responsibility of government to use positive means to break it up. This cannot be done by being color blind. . . .

"All would concede, I am sure, that there is nothing magic about a percentage of 30 or 40 or any other. The use of such a number becomes dangerous because it reinforces stereotypes about what such proportions should be and limits experimentation on how to deal with the many other variables."

This brings us to the basic question: Can racial quotas be justified? If so, under what circumstances?

"I am sure few of us are doctrinaire on this issue. For myself, for official, i.e., public agencies, I would say, no! I well realize there are great traumas to personality of both Negroes and whites stemming from what has been a historical past. These biases make it difficult to achieve an integrated community. I have very much sympathy for public officials who are experimenting with programs designed to achieve mixed groups in public agencies. Their objectives are good. I have not been able to bring myself to an endorsement of such a program, however.

"With 67,000 applicants for public housing, for instance, and many of these consisting of families of several members living in one room, it is hard to endorse holding an apartment vacant hoping some one with a white skin will apply and pass by those in such need.

"If such programs of benign quotas are launched it appears that the following points should be clear:

"1. What are the criteria by which one establishes what the quota should be? 20 per cent, 30 per cent, 90, etc.

"2. Can such a quota be defended as an interim or 'phase' operation? There is the assumption here that all desire a society where, ultimately, there is free association of peoples, yet, when quotas are established they tend to become 'frozen,' institutionalized and difficult to change.

"3. How are the 'weightings' established by which 'desegregation' as a value transcends 'nondiscrimination' as a value? It should be noted that unless there is 'discrimination' there is little problem.

"4. How can the 'phase operation' be terminated when it has outlived its usefulness? Once social structure is created it tends to resist change.

"5. Are we sure we are not injecting our own values to deprive even minority people of their right to self-segregation? Does this threaten the entire pattern of grouping around social and religious interests? For example, in one neighborhood in New Rochelle over 90 per cent of the children in the school are Jewish in background. These are homes of the \$40,000 class. Most such upper-income people could have chosen—with some search—more integrated neighborhoods in which to live. Does such a policy of quota programing deny this privilege?

"Private agencies are in a less vulnerable position, although they too face the dilemma that—pushed too far—quotas mean discrimination. Where

such measures are employed it should be clear, even here, that there is an element of experiment in it; that there are clearly delineated procedures for sharing the fruits of the experiment with others.

"In summation, my position is as follows: (1) As we move beyond *desegregation* toward integration, we move away from Justice Harlan's position on the role of government as regards race, creed and color. (2) Public and private agencies both must take into account race or creed if creative roles are to be developed and maintained.

"This 'due regard for race or creed' cannot, however, be used as an excuse to resort to preferential treatment of people because of race, creed or color. In such areas as housing and education, where weighting of variables includes the need for mixed association as a social value, it should be very clear how and in what way this value takes precedence over the need for service as a value. Perhaps the establishment of these weights is the next task ahead." ("Can Intergroup Quotas Be Benign?" *Journal of Intergroup Relations*, Autumn 1960)

STATUS VERSUS WELFARE

Mr. Wilson, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, discusses the conflict among Negroes between the desires for integration and for material improvement.

James Q. Wilson

"In New York, the Urban League and the NAACP opposed the building of a new public housing project in Harlem on the grounds that it would institutionalize and solidify residential segregation in that area by being almost all-Negro. The Negro political leaders and (originally) the Negro press disagreed, and pressed for the project, claiming that it filled a material need for more decent shelter." The Housing Authority won approval for the project, capitalizing on the division among Negroes.

"The question of how private charitable funds should be distributed among hospitals in Detroit, for example, raised the problem of a Negro private hospital operated by prominent Negro doctors. The Negro press and other groups protested giving funds to an all-Negro institution, arguing that integration of Negroes into white private hospitals would be hindered by such a move. The NAACP, which included among its directors some of the Negro doctors involved, was immobilized by the conflict—unable to take a positive stand and pursue it with vigor. In the end, this made little difference. The existence of any controversy among a large group of potential beneficiaries about how the funds were to be divided meant that the donors, acting on the principle that such gifts should promote good-will rather than ill-will and that controversy would 'taint' the cause, decided not to give any money at all to Negro hospitals." Thus, the goal of the status seekers in this case was served by creating controversy, not by unifying the Negro community.

"Issues in the Negro communities of various cities often tend to unfold in a comparable fashion." For example, Negro mothers in New York "on more than one occasion picketed schools in Harlem to protest the inadequacy of the facilities. A lawyer instituted legal proceedings on their behalf. These acts created difficulties for Negro civic agencies. They are often caught up by the problem of how to press for school integration, rather than school improvement, without alienating Negro opinion (which sees improvement as the more evident and immediate problem). Organized civic action has recently been focused on a plan to have the school system

transport, by bus, Negro children from overcrowded schools in Negro areas (such as Bedford-Stuyvesant) to all-white schools in Glendale (Queens). The NAACP has given little support to boycott and picketing efforts directed at substandard schools within Harlem, although it has announced it will defend a lower-court decision (being appealed by the Board of Education) critical of the Board's policy in Harlem schools.

"This issue was characteristic of much of Negro civic action: Strong, often exaggerated and oversimplified charges are made by a Negro acting for people seeking certain welfare ends. There is a reluctance by the established civic agencies to endorse the charges without reserve, in part because they see complexities which the rhetoric of the agitator has obscured and in part because they have access to important centers of influence which they do not wish to jeopardize by name-calling and a rigid attitude. The Negro press, attracted by issues which have drama and a grass-roots appeal, engages in unbridled attacks on the offending system. Soon a position is reached in which Negro civic groups can no longer stand aside without paying heavy costs in terms of Negro criticism, and they are compelled to take sides.

"The issue of what *ought* to be done, what are the ends to be served, becomes muddled. Not only is there a conflict between welfare goals ('give us better schools') and status goals ('let us into white schools on an equal basis'), but many issues such as the worth of 'progressive' education and teaching techniques, having nothing to do with race, become buried in the rhetoric of race issues and values. Means and ends are steadily interacting: general or loosely defined ends are sought, and means are selected to attain them. But the means selected have consequences in terms of mobilizing or alienating support and inflaming followers. These consequences react upon the ends chosen, narrowing them to those most appealing for the organization being created and making more rigid the position taken on those ends. Given the existence of latent but strong attitudes (such as race feeling) in a community, civic leaders can rarely be deliberate in their choice of means." (*Negro Politics*)

THE NEW ORLEANS STORY

Skip Williamson



(*Help!* March 1961)

MAKING THE ECONOMY WORK

THE U.S. FACES A COMPETITIVE WORLD

Mr. Drucker is a management consultant, author, and chairman of the Management Area, Graduate Business School of New York University.

Peter F. Drucker

There have been basic structural changes in the world economy that require new attitudes, new policies, and new concepts. What are these new, but permanent, conditions that we must learn to live with? Let me present them in a series of theses.

"1. The world economy has become competitive again for the first time since 1913 or, at the very least, for the first time since 1929.

"This means, first, that everyone in the free world can get anything he wants—and can pay for—in the quantity and quality he wants, from a number of different suppliers, and in a number of different countries. It means, secondly, that these suppliers are actively competing for business in every market.

"This is a great achievement—one that has been the aim (the almost utopian aim) of American policy since the end of World War II. . . . But this achievement is not an unmixed blessing. One rather disquieting implication is that there no longer will be any 'orderly' prices for any major industrial supply or product in the world market. As recently as two years ago, the world-price structure was essentially based on prices set by American companies and on American costs and market conditions. Prices outside this country tended to be determined by adding a percentage to the American price. . . .

"A further implication of this first thesis is that even in the domestic market major industrial products and supplies will not be priced on the basis of American conditions. What will determine the price in any major market in the world (including the American domestic market) is the marginal, incremental income of the most efficient major producer anywhere in the free world. . . .

"2. Our ability to increase exports determines whether (and by how much) America's national income can grow; it can only grow less—and quite a bit less—than U.S. exports. The international economy, not the domestic economy, sets the limitations on U.S. growth and prosperity and is the determining area of economic performance.

"This situation is something quite new for modern America to face—though it was pretty generally accepted for the largely agricultural United States that existed before 1900. . . .

"It is not only that 4 million to 5 million jobs depend directly on export production and export sales (perhaps 3 million jobs in manufacturing and up to 2 million jobs in distribution, transportation, banks, insurance, and other services). It is also the fact that 15 million jobs or more depend on our ability to obtain raw materials and supplies abroad on the same terms, at least, as those on which the other industrial countries obtain them. As we grow, our import demands will grow disproportionately. . . .

"As our gold stock dwindles to the minimum reserve we need for internal

Keep
tariffs
low

uses and for the settlement of normal current balances, economic growth and a healthy and balanced economy will increasingly depend on our ability to raise exports faster than the national product, and at least as fast as our imports. . . .

"3. *Protective tariffs, despite the fact that many businessmen regard them as panaceas, only serve to make matters much worse.* . . .

"If there has to be support for endangered industries, direct subsidies are much cheaper, much more effective, and much less distorting. The reason that protective tariffs can harm our economy is simply that our major export markets are precisely the countries from which those 'undesirable imports' come. The major market for most of our exports simply cannot be the 'underdeveloped countries,' no matter how much aid we pump into them. Underdeveloped countries are no market for the products of highly developed economies. They do not have the money to pay for them or, and this matters more, the need or the ability to use them." Our major markets are necessarily highly developed countries.

"Let's face some other facts while we are at it. Most probably, we escaped a serious depression in 1960 only because the developed countries (i.e., our industrial competitors) greatly stepped up their purchases from the United States. This was accomplished mainly through lowering barriers against U. S. imports. The resulting additional 1960 exports to the industrial countries abroad provided something like an extra half-million jobs for the American economy—over and above the one-and-a-half million jobs that exports to these countries had already provided in 1959. . . .

"As this 1960 experience proves, we stand to gain infinitely more through a liberal low-tariff policy on the part of 'competitive' countries than we stand to lose from their exports into the United States. And we stand to lose infinitely more—in jobs as well as in balance of payments—from a high-tariff policy on the part of these countries than we could possibly gain from a high-tariff policy on the part of the United States. . . .

"For us to go protectionist would, in other words, serve only to destroy major American markets. But for us to have and use the threat of going protectionist—unless we are granted abroad what we grant here—would certainly create major world markets.

"4. *Equally defensive—and equally dangerous—is the moving of productive facilities for the American market to another 'low-wage' area.*

"First, let me stress that building plants abroad is all to the good—if the purpose is to broaden the market for American goods and hence increase our income. . . . What I do hold to be completely foolhardy is the building of a foreign plant to supply the American manufacturer for the home market. This is rank defeatism; furthermore, it aggravates the disease by eroding purchasing power at home.

"Here is the criterion that should be applied: Does building the plant result, ultimately, in a strengthening of America's competitive position? If it does—by supplying a part, for instance, that makes the finished product more salable at home and abroad—then all is well. But if it does not, this decision, in fairly short order, will not even be intelligent policy for the individual company—let alone for the economy. Such a move amounts to strangulation of our nation's economic power and competitive capacity.

"5. *There is no way out but to restore U. S. competitive edge and product leadership" and to retain it where it is still unimpaired.*

"The economic developments in the world that produced the 'dollar crisis' are fundamentally 'good' in the sense that they are situations calling for aggressive, offensive action by American business. . . .

Keep
plants
at home

"Thus, the maintenance of American competitive strength must be a major goal of American economic policy and of the policy of any U. S. business. This is something all other countries have had to learn—and in this process we usually supplied the teachers and the textbooks. Now, we have to learn a few lessons ourselves. One such lesson is in the area of labor relations; both management and unions will have to accept the fact that ability to remain competitive is just as important as ability to pay or the political balance of strength.

"6. *It is not likely that raw material prices today are too low; it is much more likely that prices of manufactured goods are too high—by something like 25 per cent.*

"This assumption (and it is no more than that, even though it has high probability) rests on the fact that, measured by historical relationships, today's raw material prices are not too low in relation to the profitability of the most efficient producer. In such a situation any attempts to inflate the price through 'price agreements' or cartels (such as the international oil cartel recently proposed by Venezuela and some of the Arabian oil countries) are totally ineffectual.

"This indicates, then, that manufactured goods are far overpriced in relation to raw materials. The orthodox way to restore the balance between them is to cut manufactured goods prices without cutting raw material prices and other costs—i.e., to deflate." Then there is a second way. "This is the Keynesian method of 'reflation' whereby raw material prices (and wages) are raised while finished goods prices remain unchanged." But there is still a third way, and it is the best method. It involves substitution. For example, prestressed concrete is substituted for structural steel and is, in certain applications, just as good, and a great deal cheaper.

"Developing substitutions which cut the cost to the customer without disrupting the price structure or the economy offers special opportunities to American manufacturers." Here is the payoff for the tremendous amounts of effort and money poured into research and development.

"7. *Any American businessman, especially a manufacturer, should gauge the effectiveness and the efficiency of his business by its ability to compete in the world.*

"Even if the businessman has no export business and does not intend to have any, the question he asks about his market, even his local one, should be this: 'What will I have to do to make my product capable of competing in the Japanese market?' The one suggestion I can offer that applies to every case I have seen is that manufacturers concentrate their product lines.

"The shibboleth of the 'full product line' is, in my experience, a major cause of American inability to compete. Typically, our manufacturing businesses offer a thousand 'lines.' Of these, 20 or 30 account for four-fifths of all sales and for all profits while constituting only two-fifths of the costs. The remaining 900 or so account for one fifth of all sales, make no profit (even with all the 'breaks' given to them by traditional cost accounting), and eat up three fifths of all costs. . . .

"To be competitive, I have learned, companies have to concentrate on the three or four products (or activities) that account for the overwhelming bulk of all sales—and consider the others merely as 'sales promotions' on which one spends only carefully budgeted amounts. . . .

"Seizing the offensive is the only strategy that can work in an expanding and competitive economy—regardless of whether it is national or international. U.S. business must take the initiative internationally—in price, in styling, in innovation and design, and in marketing. We have to accept

what we all know to be elemental—that taking a defensive position can, at best, only limit losses. And we need gains.” (“This Competitive World,” *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1961)

THE WASTE OF NEGRO MANPOWER

A professor of economics at Columbia University's Business School, Dr. Ginzberg is also the director of Columbia's Project on the Conservation of Human Resources.

Eli Ginzberg

“How can the Negro child develop positive attitudes towards work when he early comes to recognize that almost all of the desirable jobs in the community are closed to him? To the extent that a high proportion of Negro men are more or less dissatisfied with the lack of opportunity at work, to that extent will their children tend to grow up with a negative orientation towards the world of work—to view it largely as an unpleasant necessity bereft of any positive quality. The problem is compounded by the fact that in a high proportion of Negro families the man is not the responsible head. In part, this is a legacy of slavery; in part it reflects the heightened instability of family life as more and more men and women seek to escape the confines of segregation through relocating themselves in more favorable areas. In brief, a high proportion of Negro youth grows up without any understanding of, or belief in, their capacity to shape their lives through work.

“Next to the home, the school represents the most important agency of society in helping to prepare young people for work and life. Negroes have access to poorer schools both in terms of teaching staffs and physical accommodations. But schools influence the development of young people in many ways other than through providing basic instruction. The good school helps to widen the horizon of young people so that they are challenged to exert themselves. It is very difficult for the segregated school—as well as for the nonsegregated school in an impoverished neighborhood—to do this, for it does not have within it the wide range of diversity that is generally characteristic of schools that draw children from the community at large.

“The segregated school is also hard pressed to establish and maintain proper standards. It is handicapped by having to draw its staff exclusively from among Negroes who generally have had poorer preparation than white teachers. Further, the able or superior Negro child cannot be easily stimulated to do his best because his teacher is forced to adjust the pace to the average and the school is not likely to be able to sponsor special classes for the gifted. Worst of all, the able Negro student is likely to acquire a mistaken view of excellence since he can measure himself only against his classmates.

“Segregation significantly influences the training Negroes receive. The vocational courses available to Negroes in the high schools of the South provide instruction mainly for those fields where Negroes can find employment. Negroes have little opportunity to be trained in school for the metal trades, electrical work, and the better paying work on which modern industry is based. . . . Many young Negroes, including some with above average endowment, adopt the view that there is little point in their making a special effort since they are arbitrarily barred from entering any of the preferred jobs. The pressures to enjoy the present rather than to plan for the future are very powerful in adolescence and the young Negro

has an easy rationale to give up the struggle to make the most of himself even before he starts.

"Segregation also leads to faulty occupational choices among the minority who are determined, despite the difficulties in their environment, to aim high. Since few skilled occupations and professions are open to Negroes, they tend to be oversupplied because those who want to better themselves have so few alternatives. Many who have prepared themselves for teaching have done so not because they have an interest in and aptitude for instructing young people but largely because it offered them the best chance to advance themselves.

"What men can accomplish in the labor market depends not only on their native abilities and their education but also on their work experience. Since Negroes are not generally hired for production jobs, they are automatically cut off from on-the-job training which plays such a key part in the worker's acquisition of skill. He also has no access to the wide range of formal courses that modern corporations have established to raise the skill level of the work force. Restricted as Negroes largely are to menial jobs and cut off from the production line, the gap between them and the rest of the work force is constantly widening as industry becomes ever more dependent on advanced technology and a higher order of skill. . . .

"The Southern economy has made significant gains despite the underdevelopment—and underutilization—of its Negro manpower. The South has been, and continues to be, characterized by manpower surpluses, particularly untrained manpower. This helps to explain more than any other single factor the persistence of segregation in the face of mounting legal pressure and moral challenges.

"What of the future? . . . The costs of segregation in manpower terms can be briefly summarized. Much of the potential of the Negro minority goes to waste because it fails to be developed. Many just coast through school; others drop out prematurely because they see no point in continuing. Still others, because of a lack of opportunity, never become aware that they possess special aptitudes. Much of what is developed is lost to the South through out-migration. The Southern Negro who becomes an electronics specialist in the Armed Forces is not likely to return home after discharge. He will relocate in the North.

"Economists have long argued against arbitrary power in the market place, emphasizing that it can lead only to a faulty allocation and a lessened efficiency in the use of resources. The rapid expansion of the nation's economy during the past two decades had hidden from the South the price that it has been paying for the maintenance of segregation. This price is constantly rising." ("Segregation and Manpower Waste," *Phylon*, Winter 1960)

SHOULD WE REPLACE THE INCOME TAX?

An economist rebuts the argument for an expenditure tax developed by Matthew J. Kust (see Current, March 1961, page 49).

Leon H. Keyserling

"It is argued that such tax changes would speed economic growth. In some circumstances, this argument is valid. The rate of economic growth depends upon (a) the rate of expansion of employment and (b) the rate of improvement in productivity or output per employed worker, which turns largely upon investment in plant and technology. . . .

"But the low rate of economic growth during [the last] eight years has

not been due to insufficient growth in productivity. To the contrary, it has occurred because the expansion of private and public consumption combined has not kept up with the actual growth in productivity and in the labor force. This is the very meaning of the chronically increasing idleness of manpower, plant, and technology to date. In fact, during the short-lived booms during this period, profits and 'saving' flowing into investment in the plant and technology which yield productivity gains have been excessive *relative* to consumption; and only the three recessions which have resulted inevitably from this imbalance account for the highly volatile shrinkage in profits and investments in some years.

"Until consumption is sufficiently expanded to absorb most of the currently idle manpower, plant, and technology plus such advances in these factors as are now occurring, tax changes to spur investment further would only create further imbalances in the structure. And when the expansion of consumption approaches even temporary sufficiency (which now requires vast expansion of *both* private and public consumption to restore reasonably full use of existing resources and to reduce private poverty and public neglect), profits and 'saving' and investment will again tend to err on the high rather than the low side in the absence of other fundamental changes conducive to an improved distribution of national income. An 'expenditure tax' would work counter to this improved distribution," because low-income families spend larger portions of their incomes than upper-income families. (Letter, *The New Republic*, Feb. 13, 1961)

BROADCASTING AGAINST PROSPERITY

A former head of the Queens (N.Y.) Electrical Appliance Merchants Association says that television and radio are strangling economic demand.

**Anthony B.
Meany, Sr.**

"For thirty years the masses have been held in a viselike grip, enslaved, controlled and misled by radio-TV home recreation, unaware of the disastrous effect this plague of inactivity and idleness has on our way of life and national security. . . . Our economists have overlooked the fundamental laws of business economics, i.e., that business activity and employment come only through human activity and that as man moves, so only do materials, machines and money. . . . Bad weather keeps people indoors—hurts general business. How much greater does radio-TV home entertainment do likewise? . . .

"Gas and oil producers supply millions of viewers with baseball, opera and various kinds of 'free' home entertainment, actually removing the necessity of their products—by keeping cars in garages. Hat makers sponsor fight programs, prolong life of headgear. Who wears hats at home? Soap companies, spellbinding us in our living rooms—keeping our bodies and wearing apparel cleaner, and soap bills fewer. Magazines engage TV storytellers, cut down potential reading time. . . . Razorblade maker bringing sporting events to our living rooms, eliminating that extra night-time shave. . . . Children's programs at home keep them quiet and inactive, decrease need for more clothes, shoes, bread and other food energy."

According to the National Association of Broadcasters, "29 per cent of all products advertised on TV are for outdoor use only, such as automobiles, tires, gasoline, clothing, cosmetics, etc. The sales of these products would be greatly augmented through necessity if the people were forced to go outdoors for their diversion and recreation." ("Radio-TV Advertising—Co-Agents of Communism," Address, New York Lions Club, Feb. 7, 1961)

CITIES TO LIVE IN

URBAN RENEWAL FOR WHOM?

The deputy director of the Charles Center renewal project in Baltimore finds weaknesses in urban renewal's "most apparent source of strength: the variety and dedication of its supporters."

Martin Millsbaugh

"Never before, perhaps, has government at all levels been lobbied in behalf of the same cause by both liberals and conservatives, haves and have-nots, welfare statistes and rugged individualists. All these have embraced the same vague, but virile, objective: the salvage and renewal of American cities. . . .

"In spite of this broad-based, enthusiastic public and official support (or more accurately, because of it), there are booby traps in the road ahead for urban renewal. . . . On close examination, we find that [its dedicated supporters] not only come from many different walks of life; they also have many different reasons for being in the urban renewal movement, and hence a variety of ideas about the results that urban renewal should produce. This has not been much of a problem in the past, because urban renewal generally has been in the slum clearance phase, and most people are agreed on the need for eliminating the worst conditions of slums and blight. Now the program is in the rebuilding stage, and the results will not be all things to all men. Those whose aim is to preserve and renew the individual character of the city will not be satisfied with redevelopment projects that produce only" monotonous clichés.

"The most serious clash, however, threatens to arise from a conflict between social and economic motivations among the supporters of urban renewal. The slum clearance program was launched as a social welfare program, with a major subsidy from public funds and with roots in the New Deal philosophy of government. Its aim was 'a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family,' to quote the preamble of the Housing Act of 1949. This is still the national housing policy and the primary goal of a large segment of urban renewal supporters. But in recent years, the economic plight of the cities has become more apparent, along with the resulting threat to private economic activities. The urban renewal movement has been joined by a large and powerful group of supporters whose interest is primarily in the elimination of obsolete land uses, and the renewal of property values for purposes of both taxation and investment. . . .

"Before urban renewal becomes a greatly expanded program, affecting the lives and properties of a great many more people, it would be well for those who support the movement to sort out their own motivations, and those of their colleagues. Neither the social nor the economic objective can be given priority at this stage of history, but it is necessary to achieve a balance between these and other objectives, if urban renewal is to maintain continued acceptance as a public policy which justifies the condemnation of private property, the displacement of thousands of families and businesses, and the forced expenditure of private funds for rehabilitation.

**Relocation
can be good
in itself**

"One of the first steps needed to achieve a balance of objectives is to recognize the various aspects of urban renewal for what they are. Slum clearance and redevelopment, for instance, are more economic than social, in spite of the social welfare label that was placed on them in the Housing Act of 1949. No matter how bad the slum may be, you cannot improve a man's living conditions by taking his home away from him. Similarly, when his property is offered for sale to another private owner, who agrees to redevelop it in accordance with the planned objectives of the city, those objectives must be economically viable or the land will never be sold. If the processes of slum clearance and redevelopment are freed of social welfare overtones, it should be possible to apply them in the places and to the extent demanded by the community's planning goals. One effect would be the elimination of the 'predominantly residential' requirement in the present federal law, which provides that 80 per cent of the federal grant funds must be spent on projects that are concerned with housing—overlooking the fact that commercial and industrial projects may often make a more vital contribution to the health of a community.

"While it is important to recognize the economic nature of slum clearance and redevelopment, it is just as important to recognize the social contribution that is made (or can be made) by relocation. A man's living conditions are not improved by clearing his slum dwelling, but they may be vastly improved by finding him a good home in a decent neighborhood, and by teaching him how to pay for it, maintain it, and enjoy it. Much too often, relocation has been regarded as merely a step in the redevelopment process—a chore that must be performed before we can get on with the more glamorous business of building new towers and plazas for the city of the future.

"Many dedicated relocation workers have now proved that relocation can be a positive program in itself: not only for the purpose of directing slum families and businesses to new locations, but also for the purpose of uncovering the complex social problems that harass slum families and locating the expert help that those families did not know existed. Conceived as a program of counseling, of education, and of social welfare, relocation can make a vast contribution to the health of the community—over and above its connection with slum clearance and redevelopment.

"The same is true of rehabilitation, which often focuses on poverty-stricken homeowners, who cannot afford to maintain or improve their homes because of some overriding social, medical, or family problem. It is also true of public housing, which becomes the repository of more and more of the community's problem families, as the average level of family income goes up.

**Separate housing
from "renewal"**

"Indeed, there is strong evidence that a city might profit from creating a new type of local program, which would function as a full-fledged arm of urban renewal, distinct from slum clearance and redevelopment. This could be called a municipal housing program, recognizing that housing is inseparable from every other facet of family life. To such a program would be assigned the existing urban renewal functions of: (1) relocation; (2) rehabilitation; and (3) public housing, plus two new functions: (4) the co-ordination of all the social services that are related to housing and family life; and (5) the stimulation of new private housing construction in the locations, at the price levels, and with the physical design standards that are dictated by community needs." ("Urban Renewal and Metropolitan Affairs," Address, Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, Dec. 28, 1960)

DEALING WITH CRIMINALS

CATHOLICS AND THE DEATH PENALTY

An associate editor of Jubilee, a lay Catholic monthly, argues that executing Catholic murderers is bad, but executing nonbelievers is worse.

Wilfrid Sheed

"The debate about capital punishment usually flares up around one criminal at a time. This year it is Adolf Eichmann, last year Caryl Chessman. The same arguments are used and reused, the same statistics and graphs, but always haunted, dominated by one face: should we kill *this* man? Let Eichmann be all murderers. Should we kill Eichmann?"

"As long as the debate remains so deeply personal, conducted feverishly between the arrest and the gibbet, it is unlikely that anything wise will be done about the death penalty. This means we shall continue to shamble along with this loose-fitting punishment, which applies equally to a man who killed four million, and to a man who killed none—but which seldom applies, in this country at least, to the rich, the prominent or (quaint footnote) to pretty girls. . . . For the most part, the kind of man a jury is willing to condemn hardly seems worth saving. . . .

"In the bulk of current moral controversies, Catholics are likely to find themselves being associated with what looks like a 'tough' line. Man for man, Catholics are obviously no more sadistic than their neighbors; but their reflex against sentimentality is so quick that it sometimes looks like heartlessness. . . . Unluckily, the world's kindness often proves delusive and Catholics are sometimes tempted to suppose that toughness is, *per se*, the best and most natural policy. Almost absent-mindedly, some of them will seek out the harsher side of a discussion, knowing that sentimentality will eventually be discovered lurking on the other; if it isn't, they may report it anyway. . . . Nothing gives more scandal than to see Christians practicing a vague and arid cruelty, simply because their opponents have been wrong on other occasions. . . .

"According to traditional Catholic teaching, society has a clear right to take life in its own defense. Capital punishment is not to be considered so much as a salutary practice as a baleful warning. . . : we leave punishment, simply as punishment, to God. So, if the warning doesn't work, if the trespasser can't make sense of it, it might as well be taken down, and the reprisal that goes with it. If we base our killing on deterency alone, we must estimate to a nicety the effect of the warning."

In this country, we have a kind of token capital punishment which proves very little. "States which have abolished capital punishment are not high on the national murder list—but this negative evidence is rendered still more negative by the rarity of executions in *all* states. . . . The main thing to be said about deterency statistics is, perhaps, that they establish a reasonable doubt. And reasonable doubt has usually been grounds for sparing life."

If a few murderers are bluffed out of killing by the electric chair, they "seem to be matched by an equal number who are, in some subterranean way, stimulated by the prospect of self-immolation."

**What does it
mean to be
executed?**

**Rehabilitation
by shock**

And it should not be forgotten that "mistakes have been made in the past, in verifiable matters of fact, and innocent men have died for them. One shudders to guess at the mistakes that must have been made in reading minds and hearts. Whatever may be said of the psychiatric sciences, it can be agreed by all parties that the establishment of sanity and insanity is one of the most unsatisfactory affairs in law. And yet, time and again, life hangs by nothing sturdier."

Moreover, juries "can be squeamish about condemning to death, and the spectre of capital punishment may sometimes deter them from punishing at all. This too must be weighed: more murderers get away scot-free, under our present rules, than any other kind of criminal."

But the heart of the question is: does our form of killing ever equate with the murderer's? "To the believing Catholic, the torturous execution may seem . . . perhaps the best a murderer can reasonably hope for: no suffering is useless, and in this case, it may enable a man who has lived in selfish fantasy to see the reality of what he has done; at the same time, he will have every chance—a chaplain, time on his hands, and thought-provoking surroundings—to set his soul in order. Thus, he is in fact receiving more mercy than he gave when he killed without warning.

"But to a nonbeliever, death, as Dr. Johnson pointed out, is as nothing compared with the apprehension of death. The scales jerk violently, and we find ourselves giving a man the most horrible punishment he can ever know—not death, but apprehension: most elaborate and concentrated, weeks or years of living hell, with no repentance guaranteed at the end of it.

"This is what believers must try to understand, that we are dealing with two kinds of punishment, that we are, in fact, punishing nonbelievers more severely than they know how to punish us. . . .

"But the nonbeliever must make his own effort at understanding. The believer's position is not based on cruelty, after all (except perhaps in a few cases, on absent-minded cruelty), but on what he would consider, in his own case, to be justice and some mercy. . . . It is because he believes that the murderer is the better for paying his debt to society, and that society is the better for having its debts paid.

"We may sometimes seem to jeer at those who believe in rehabilitation of murderers—but of course, our whole case for capital punishment (those of us who make it—I don't, myself) is based on rehabilitation. Rehabilitation by shock treatment, if you like: but it has never been the executioner's plan to send a man to Hell. And it is not Catholics who have taught the unreconstructability of man, of any man.

"But in deciding what is best for the society in which we live, it is not enough merely to consult our own feelings; if capital punishment is, to many of its victims, cruel and unusual punishment, we will not help them much by saying it doesn't seem so bad to us—and wouldn't to them either, if they had the gift of faith. . . .

"Unfortunately, if one has any reservations at all about the value of killing murderers, meeting bloodshed with bloodshed, it is assumed that one is against punishment altogether. This may be where the argument breaks down—there is some sentimentality on the anti side, just enough to confirm the worst suspicions of our hard-thinkers.

"Speaking, therefore, as one reservationist, I should like to see punishment, if not stiffer, then at least more invariable and inflexible than it is. If juries were not so afraid of condemning to death, they might actually provide a firmer justice (after all, they share the same fears about death

**Why execution
but not
euthanasia?**

as their victims). Punishment should be up to the harshness consistent with deterrence. But I would rather see a man tortured, most horribly, than see the life principle removed from his body, by a civil servant dedicated to this work." The deterrence value of torture "sounds most promising, and the door would still be open for rehabilitation. And the commandment only says 'Thou shalt not kill,' not 'Thou shalt not torture.' Nevertheless, even our most ardent bully boys have had the grace not to recommend torture—even for convicted torturers.

"It is well that we shrink from torture, but surprising that we do not shrink from the more extreme step of taking life. We have seen that for Catholics, death is not the final thing it is for some; yet we know that, in such matters as euthanasia, it is Catholics who most firmly defend the sanctity of human life. Our defense in the one case may lose some of its edge, if we fail to show equal sensitiveness in other sectors. . . . To say that any man is 'hopeless,' and to treat him accordingly, is to make nonsense of our beliefs. . . .

"It is worth weighing Bernard Shaw's claim that murder and capital punishment are not opposites that cancel one another, but similars that breed their kind: the public trial, featuring a man fighting for his life, is a sensational arena, where more than justice may be distorted. The victim's family may (or may not) wind up feeling much-needed relief [and the very real consolations of vengeance]: society at large may only be aggravating a festering excitement. . . . The public vindictiveness loosed during a big murder trial is one of the most terrible fringe results of our system (the letters received by Governor Brown during the Chessman episode apparently passing all reason), and whether or not this public excitation acts as a safety valve—some safety valve!—it is an ugly thing in itself, hardly the ideal of a Christian civilization. . . .

"But what about the further point, that unelectrified murderers would be left to run around loose, to kill other people? There is some evidence that murder is usually a one-shot affair, that released murderers do not as a rule strike again (Governor Di Salle of Ohio writes that he himself lives quite calmly in a nest of them; the Governor's mansion is staffed by convicted murderers). But one or two exceptions would be enough to justify public panic. Parole boards have earned a curious reputation for addle-pated leniency which has fueled this panic, and many people have wished to see murderers done in before the parole boards can get their kindly hands on them. But surely, it would make more sense to tighten parole regulations, and the penal structure generally, than to kill out of desperation?" ("Some Thoughts About the Death Penalty," *Jubilee*, February 1961)

COMPENSATION FOR THE VICTIMS

A legal correspondent for an Edinburgh newspaper discusses the possibilities.

The Scotsman

"The attitude of society towards the criminal has undergone a distinct change in emphasis in recent years, with the result that the courts nowadays in many cases seem more concerned with the reform and rehabilitation of the criminal, rather than [with] punishing him and obtaining retribution for his victim. . . . It may well be that a penal system would not only provide a more effective deterrent to crime, but would also find a greater moral value if the concept of personal reparation to the victim were

**Restitution
by the criminal**

added to the concepts of deterrence by punishment and of reform by training.

"The redemptive value of punishment would probably be increased if the offender were made to realize the extent of the injury which he had done to his victim as an individual, rather than to the general interests of society as a whole. . . .

"There are really two separate aspects of the matter—restitution by the criminal to his victim, and compensation paid by the state to the victim.

"The restitution aspect has had a long history in Scots law. Under our early law, the offender could escape punishment by paying damages to the victim or his relatives, and also a fine to the feudal overlord who was responsible for maintaining law and order, and whose 'peace' had been disturbed. . . . It is technically possible for a person who has been assaulted and robbed to bring an action of damages against his assailant. Such actions are rarely worthwhile, because the assailant is probably without funds to start with, and once imprisoned is denied the opportunity of earning anything.

"In England the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 gives the Criminal Courts power to order payment by a convicted person of either damages or compensation, provided that the court puts the accused on probation or gives him a conditional discharge. If, however, the magistrate pronounces a more severe penalty, he cannot order payment of compensation or damages to the victim," nor would it be practicable until prisoners can "be given proper and suitable employment, and also paid the 'economic rate for the job.' . . .

**Compensation
by the state**

"Assuming that the prisoner is not in a position to make reparation to his victim, should the state make compensation instead? In theory this must surely be right, because the state has failed in its primary duty to preserve law and order and to protect the individual.

"But the present legal situation is anomalous, and this may be demonstrated by a simple example. A workman who is injured during the course of his employment may claim injury and disablement benefits under the National Insurance Acts, and if he is killed his widow gets a death benefit. But if on the way home from work he is robbed of his pay packet and is beaten to death, no compensation is payable under the Acts."

Several measures have been proposed recently to bring persons injured or killed as a result of serious crimes under the National Insurance Acts. But they presuppose that the criminal is brought to justice. What happens if he is never found, or is tried and acquitted? "That in no way lessens the injuries sustained by the victim, and should not be a reason for excluding his claim to compensation.

"On the other hand, if no assailant can be traced, how will it be possible to show that the injuries were genuinely received as a result of criminal violence and not by accident? There seems to be considerable scope here for fraudulent claims."

The proposals have dealt only with personal injuries caused through violence, taking "no account of the many ways in which a person who is the victim of criminal activities can suffer substantial loss of property. Jewelry may be stolen from a house, a handbag may be snatched, or a person may be defrauded in business. Even comprehensive insurance cannot give protection in all these cases. The loss of the savings of a lifetime may be much more serious than a minor physical injury sustained in attempting to apprehend an escaping criminal." ("Criminals Should Be Made to Pay," *The Scotsman*, Feb. 9, 1961)

CHURCH SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC FUNDS

SURVIVAL THROUGH PUBLIC AFFILIATION

In the midst of a major Catholic campaign demanding direct government subsidies as essential to the survival of church-related schools and colleges, the lay Catholic weekly The Commonweal offers an alternative suggestion by Father Garvey of the philosophy department of Assumption University, Windsor, Ontario.

Edwin C. Garvey

"That college 'affiliation' has become an accepted practice in Canada is apparently not widely known in the United States. Yet this idea—the association of several colleges, under differing denominational administrations, to form a single university with commonly shared facilities—is an application of pluralism to the sphere of university education which would seem to hold special interest for educators in the U. S., particularly Catholic educators, who, besides being plagued by financial problems, are presently sensitive to the quantity and quality of the Catholic contribution to the secular world of academic learning.

"My own school, Assumption, received its university charter in 1953, but prior to that time it had been an affiliated college of the University of Western Ontario, which is located in London, Ontario [120 miles from Windsor]. . . . Assumption remains under the control of the Basilians and now has affiliated with it, under independent sponsorship: Holy Redeemer, a Redemptorist college; Holy Name, a college of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary; Canterbury, an Anglican college; and Essex, a nondenominational college" established with the encouragement of the provincial government. The pooling and sharing of all facilities both expands the resources available to each college and frees money with which to attract talented scholars and teachers in greater numbers.

The eligibility of Essex to receive provincial grants "is, of course, a great help to the university, since Essex is responsible for costly academic areas such as the sciences, engineering, business administration and nursing. From government grants, Essex has financed the building of a new library which is operated by the university, and is presently engaged in constructing a building for the pure and applied sciences." ("Pluralism in the University," *The Commonweal*, Jan. 27, 1961)

SURVIVAL THROUGH REDEDICATION

The former U. S. Commissioner of Education, now executive officer of the Institute of Higher Education, Teachers College, Columbia University, suggests that Protestant colleges must emphasize religion or disappear.

Earl J. McGrath

"Since the nation will soon need every available classroom space, church-related colleges will unquestionably continue to exist in some form. Unless they reaffirm their religious and collegiate purposes, however, sheer economic competition will drive some to tax support. Others will decline to third- or fourth-rate privately supported institutions. All but those who

**Decline of
religious ties**

view these institutions with a deceiving sentimentalism and nostalgia must conclude that, in the absence of a rededication to undergraduate liberal education within the Christian tradition, the Protestant college *as such* is as near extinction as the whooping crane.

"These colleges do, to be sure, continue to serve hundreds of thousands of American youth. The Directory of the United States Office of Education for 1959-60 shows that during the preceding year 289 Protestant colleges enrolled 224,214 students, and 171 Catholic colleges enrolled 139,894. Thirteen Protestant and 23 Catholic universities add 62,264 and 127,431 enrollments respectively. The grand total of 553,813 constitutes no inconsiderable proportion of the nation's college and university students. . . . In the aggregate, however, the relative position of these institutions in the entire enterprise of higher education has been falling. . . .

"These institutions have not uniformly, nor to the fullest extent, made their best efforts to maintain their distinctiveness. Many have allowed considerations of expediency to attenuate if not dissolve their church-relatedness. Years ago some gave up their ecclesiastical controls in order to come under the terms of the Carnegie retirement system. Under the harsh impact of the great depression, in the hope of increasing enrollments and consequently raising more revenue, they weakened their religious traditions further in order to attract students of widely varying or of no religious convictions. Some, under the influence of a positivistic philosophy and the application of scientific method to the whole range of the human experience, permitted relativism and an easy adaptability to events to determine institutional objectives, faculty qualifications, and student behavior. . . .

"Until these colleges clearly re-establish their peculiar mission they will have no *unique* service to perform. In the intensifying competition, without a *unique* service, they will not be able to survive as church-related liberal arts colleges. . . . No one need any longer cite statistics to prove that soon there will be more than enough students to go around. Hence, institutions will be free economically to establish their own unique purposes and to select their students accordingly. . . .

"Such actions may in fact be followed by material advantages. Some prospective religiously motivated benefactors, whose philanthropies may now be restrained by their inability to see much difference between life on a campus supported from the public purse and another sustained by private gifts, may feel assured that their money would be used for the ends they cherish. Clearly, church bodies could make a stronger appeal among their members for the financial support of the colleges serving the sons and daughters of communicants."

**Mergers and
affiliations**

Without getting into the subject of church unions, it is fitting to observe that some of the smaller church-related colleges might well consider either merging with each other—where geographical and doctrinal distances permit—or at least making "common use of many of their facilities such as libraries, laboratories, gymnasiums, and large classrooms. Where advanced specialized instruction is offered in small classes, as it almost universally is, students from two or more institutions could study under the same instructor in common classes. Where geographic separation prevents such an arrangement the teacher could commute. We would do well to remember . . . that the automobile has now made unnecessary [much of] the duplication of academic services essential in a frontier society." ("The Future of the Church-Related College," Address, Annual Meeting, Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities, Denver, Jan. 10, 1961)

THE USES OF ART

THE CHURCH DISCOVERS LITERATURE

Mr. Elmen is an assistant professor of Christian ethics and moral theology at Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Ill.

Paul Elmen

"Since the end of World War II, the church has been discovering and deploring and admiring the literary imagination. To be sure, a bemused interest between theologian and literary artist is not new." What is new is the idea that the church must take the literary mind seriously, that great novels, plays, poems are part of the stuff of life itself which the church will ignore at its peril.

Divinity schools and theological seminaries, the National Council of Churches and the Student Christian Movement are giving an increasingly important place to literary studies, and "more churches than can be counted have reading groups which are a cross between a confirmation class and a Great Books course. With increasing theological and critical sophistication they discuss Silone, Camus, Greene, Joyce, Eliot, and the current best sellers and hit plays."

This lusty, if sometimes ingenuous, awakening "is part of the larger movement in our century, the church's rediscovery of the arts. Many years ago the Communists and Freudians discovered the relevance of literature to their purposes, and the church in its ponderous fashion is now acquiring an aesthetic without censorship or propaganda. No doubt, too, the heady currents of existentialism in the postwar world have had something to do with the renewed interest in the theology of literature, since existentialism is of all philosophies the most closely wedded to the arts. If it is necessary to deal with life not merely in terms of detached abstraction but also in terms of living immediacy, literature is a form of concretion most manageable for study. . . .

"Our imaginations are not often strong enough to help us understand a predicament which is not our own; but in great works of art the observer becomes a participant, shares the happiness of the characters, and suffers their indignity. Human rights then take on flesh and blood." If the church "needs to understand the society in which its work must be accomplished, how could it do other than to listen to that society's most sensitive observers? . . .

"The most plausible explanation for the rise of the new dogmatics is that the religious character of literature has been more carefully appraised. . . . We have learned to ask more than the presence of a moral, as in *Yes, Virginia, There Is a Santa Claus*; more than the presence of a clergyman, as in *Elmer Gantry*; more even than the use of Christian symbols, or a Christ image, as in *The Old Man and the Sea*. What we have learned to look for is that the work express man's ultimate longing; when we find such expression, the work has religious importance, even though that ultimate concern is never satisfied, or is satisfied by something less than the peace of God." ("Holiness and the Literary Mind," *Christian Century*, Feb. 22, 1961)

TOTAL RULE OR ATOM BOMB?

Each month Current publishes a document that seems to the editors of outstanding interest.

*This month we publish verbatim excerpts from the book *The Future of Mankind*, by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers.*

Karl Jaspers

The atomic bomb has created an altogether novel situation in which either all mankind will physically perish or there will be a change in the moral-political condition of man. An attempt must be made to clarify what appears as a choice between two fantasies.

Despite the apparent calm of our daily lives, the progress of the dread menace seems now irresistible. Topical aspects change quickly, but the over-all aspect remains the same: either the sudden outbreak of nuclear war in a matter of years or decades, or the establishment of world peace without atom bombs, with a new life on the economic basis of nuclear power. Political and legal operations alone will not take us in this direction, nor will unanimous abhorrence of the bomb. We realize today that actually no start has yet been made toward achieving world peace. . . .

Every chance has been missed: there has been no abolition of the atom bomb, with mutual controls; the free world does not have a shield of conventional weapons, which would require a militarily trained population and economic sacrifices for armament; there is no organized solidarity of the free nations, politically trustworthy and based upon the common spirit of the West. And now—probably suddenly—the moment may come when the decision on the use of the atom bomb must be made by the men whom the mechanisms of political advancement have placed at the helm. Then it will be too late for other alternatives. . . .

The thesis that the atom bomb must not be used under any circumstances is backed up by an impressive argument. If all men and life as such were to be destroyed, it says, there must be no nuclear war. For every meaningful action presupposes the continuance of life—not of my life, not of my people's life, but of human life. Hence it is better to submit even to totalitarianism than to risk a nuclear war.

To contradict this thesis seems antihuman, for it implies a lack of confidence that man will always find ways to make life worth living. To love man is to believe that his chances cannot be destroyed as long as he lives. Man's potentialities are endless. The only thing one must not do is to cut off these potentialities along with life itself.

Individuals—so the argument continues—could risk their lives for freedom; they died for the freedom of the survivors. But men cannot have the right to draw all their unwilling fellow men into the risk of perdition. Men have kindled nations with such cries as "Give me liberty or give me death," though the masses may have been unwilling; they

did not drop their fight to spare those preferring to live, but viewed their own self-sacrificing courage as controlling for all. But this has changed now that the risk throws the lives of all men into the balance. "Give me liberty or give me death" no longer applies even in the face of total rule, if the death would be the extinction of mankind. A man may think, I will kill myself if totalitarianism conquers; I would die rather than have to live a total lie—but I will never admit that one may drop atom bombs.

We hear the further argument that men fighting for freedom must not kill those who renounce force, who will live at any price and have a right to live in slavery; that he who sacrifices himself for freedom may no longer claim precedence for his cause if the others, who will live at any price, represent the cause of life as such. Granted that in all wars many people were unnecessarily killed; granted that in the saturation bombings of the last war one could not spare Allied prisoners and Germans secretly sympathizing with the Allies, that no choice could be made—but when the inevitable victims would include the whole human race, this new situation calls for a new decision: to renounce combat entirely.

There are answers to these arguments. Before insisting on the survival of mankind at any price, one must know the totalitarianism we have experienced and described: a transformation of human existence to the point where men cease to be human. The peace of totalitarianism is a desert constantly laid waste again by force against rebellious human claims. A totalitarian world state would use the atom bomb—which it alone would control—in limited doses and without endangering the life of mankind as a whole. It would use it in a gradation of terror, for purposes of extermination or simply to put down a revolt in short order. What could be expected under total rule baffles the imagination, because its nature seems humanly impossible and is accordingly not believed in reality.

If we want to defend ourselves against totalitarianism at the risk of putting an end to mankind, we may be told that all of us must accept humiliations or may come into humiliating situations; that it is proud, antihuman arrogance to reject rather than to incorporate them into the permissible self-assurance of man. The answer to this is that a humiliation that dehumanizes all of existence, every hour in the lives of all, is another matter. Whoever thinks that life may be worth living in a world that has been turned into a concentration camp must consider that confidence in man is justified only insofar as scope remains for freedom. This scope is the premise of man's potential. Mere life as such, under consummate total rule, would not be the life of animals in the abundance of nature; it would be an artificial horror of being totally consumed by man's own technological genius.

In all these arguments for and against the final risk, it must not be forgotten that both parties reckon with certainties that do not exist: with the total extinction of mankind by the superbombs or with the total corruption of humanity under total rule. Neither decision is *sure* to destroy either human life or a life that is worth living. No situation is absolutely hopeless.

The extremes
are not certain

On the one hand, we see as yet no technical possibility of destroying all life. We can imagine a day when someone will stand by a lever that would, if pulled, obliterate the planet or reduce its surface to a state of lifeless matter. But that day is far off. Anyone compelled to take the extreme risk now would do so in the hope of avoiding extremity. The danger would be enormous, but nobody can know for certain whether the first H-bomb drop would really result in further drops until mankind had perished. . . . Perhaps a remnant would survive. There might be life in some places, and from them might come new beginnings that we cannot concretely imagine. In decades or centuries, the global surface might be cleansed of radioactivity and accessible once again.

On the other hand, no one can be certain that totalitarianism would finally annihilate man's essence along with his freedom. Totalitarianism might change and disintegrate from within. Human existence might take a new grip on freedom and thus on its potential.

On both sides—final destruction of human existence by the atom bomb, and final destruction of the human essence by totalitarianism—the course to real finality is incalculable. We have to make our choice without knowing all, on the basis of all that we know within our perspective. We cannot figure it out. Perhaps we should, at the risk of dooming life itself, try to prevent what strikes us as the doom of freedom—what we hear then, on our human plane, is a challenge not to give in to total coercion but to join in defense against it, at any risk, but with a chance of success to the end. But perhaps, since the bombs exist, we should submit to total rule—and what we hear then, on our plane, is the demand to endure all, even dehumanization in a concentration-camp state, because human life shall continue at all costs, in the expectation that even in men suffering beyond all measure, in a functionalized, falsified mankind, human dignity will rise again. Both choices dare all, on the ground that hope springs eternal.

Man is free
to risk

My own thought, in view of these twin uncertainties, is that man, unlike the animals, is always free to take any risk for his freedom. If he should throw the life of mankind into the scales for liberty, he would not be taking this risk in order to die, but in order to live in freedom. If this seemed impossible, the makers of constructive history have thus far prized liberty more than life. Should things have changed? Should the present situation have brought man to his deepest fall, to the surrender of his freedom? Should that be what he considers the fulfilment of his task? If so, he would no longer be what we used to call human. Or should the ultimate yardstick now, as ever before, be not a respect for life as such, but respect for a life that is worth living insofar as human freedom can make it so?

This phrasing must not be misunderstood: the risk of life in a struggle with all-violating force differs radically from any act against life in eugenic folly, racist mania, or medical error. Respect for the potential and the value of each single human life bars tampering with any supposedly unworthy individual lives.

Man is born to be free, and the free life that he tries to save by all possible means is more than mere life. Hence, life in the sense of exist-

**How destruction
might come**

ence—individual life as well as all life—can be staked and sacrificed for the sake of the life that is worth living. . . .

Let us here consider only a few real possibilities. If a world war should break out in a situation like the present one, the chances are that one power would drop superbombs at once—fully expecting the enemy to retaliate but hoping to bring him to his knees by the first surprise blow.

Or the tension may keep building up. Each would expect the other to strike; at some point, the decision would be a matter of hours, with the outbreak and the first acts of war taking place under the enormous pressure of immediately, fatally threatening enemy action. The men at the helm would not feel free any more. Each would feel forced by the other to act against his will. The one to set off the disaster, in that terrible moment, would think he was acting because the other was about to act. Neither would want it, and yet it would happen.

The moment may come about in several ways. If totalitarianism threatens, blackmails, and tries to reach its goal without war, as it so often does, the free world may stop yielding at some point, and the threatening totalitarian leaders may feel unable to bear their failure before their collaborators and their people. Against their previous intentions, they would then feel obliged to carry out their threats as a matter of political survival. The free world would resist, because this time the threats would seem to be the first step to final subjection. Both would feel forced to let the process of destruction run its course, and each would declare the other the aggressor.

Or moods may press for violent release. The West may lose patience. The constant tension and the arms race may become unbearable and explode in passion, especially if the horror of war has paled in the minds of future generations lacking the actual experience. In the East it might be dangers from within or without that would drive the tyrants to launch their huge military machine on a course of nihilistic self-preservation.

If the fighting begins without atom bombs but subsequently turns into a struggle for existence, the one fearing to lose will use the bomb at any risk, to give himself a last chance or, at the worst, to drag the enemy down with him. It will be self-preservation—whether of freedom or of totalitarianism—or else the doom of all.

**Peaceful force
can be merciless**

Finally, peaceful force can be as merciless as martial force. The fact that it proceeds quietly, slowly, and gradually, to a point where the opponent is not physically destroyed but robbed of his means of subsistence and exposed to starvation, does not make the final effect more tolerable to the individual. Hence, physical force may always erupt against unjust, apparently hopeless peaceful strangulation. This kind of desperate uprising might even come from small countries.

Whatever happens, the decision will be made clearly and conscientiously only if the alternative between freedom and totalitarianism is really inescapable. There, none can be neutral; no one aware of responsibility can refuse to share in the decision—no one but a "saint" who lives without a claim upon the world, is not responsible for it, does not fight or meet force with force, suffers evil in silence, and is ready at any time to be tortured and killed without complaining.

Physical conflict is marked by the risk and sacrifice of life. Without

In either case
sacrifice is
necessary

sacrifice there is no human existence. Today we have two choices: either the sacrifice—unwanted by the overwhelming majority, accomplished by the daring minority—is *the existence* of mankind itself, doomed because man cannot be free; or mankind sacrifices *the means of force* in gaining its ends in a struggle. But that would mean a change in man, not in his inheritable constitution, but in his historic appearance, in the steadily imperiled balance of his being.

We may ask: Must man be able to risk everything, even the existence of mankind, to become serious enough to change? Is a new humankind to spring from the awareness of this possibly total risk and from the readiness for it? Or, if the change does not take place, shall all be doomed? Shall mankind perish if it finds no way to realize justice in a moral-political community? And if no such way is found, does the substance of humanity then lie where failure is no longer an objection—where indeed man's ultimately real, truly serious purpose is his doom?

We can raise that question, but no one can answer it. We have only mythical answers from prehistoric times, as when God sent the Flood. When the wickedness of men waxed too great, he resolved to let them perish as no longer fit to live. We have had the Flood, but we also have had Noah's rescue. And in the end, God promised never to repeat it. . . .

These mythical notions have acts of God in mind, but today the issue is not a cosmic disaster but an act accomplished by the technical skills of men. If their doings would result in self-extinction, only their doings can avoid it. In any event, the gate to the future is sacrifice—either the sacrifice of all human existence or the sacrifice of human existential interests, offered to let mankind become truly human.

If now, after all the lives that men have sacrificed in history, the total sacrifice of mankind appears possible, there remains one ambiguity: would it be an act of despair? Despair turns the man who is ready to die daring, in quest of a better life, into one who seeks death because he is tired of living. The philanthropic will to dare turns into a misanthropic will to destroy.

Or would it be an act of necessity, arising from the unfathomable source of all things? It could be necessary only as a sacrifice made for the sake of eternity. As in the reality of love, God speaks in the courage of daring all—for no adequate worldly cause, but never without such a cause. Hence, this sacrifice does not lie in adventure, only in a will to realization that bows to Transcendence if it fails. The sacrifice does not lie in magic; it means building enduringly in time. But when everything seems to be passing away like magic, it feels safe in eternity.

Because there is truth in serious, unconditional resistance to the abasement of life, the chance of sacrifice—not adequately justifiable by any purpose in the world, but based upon reason by a goal in the situation of the world—is part of man. If we must do everything to eliminate the atom bomb, the condition is that it not be done at the cost of eliminating a truly human life. The sacrifice of mankind's existence is avoidable only by a sacrifice of corresponding magnitude: by the surrender of existential entanglements that is required if men are to be changed. This sacrifice alone would be the firm foundation of a life worth living.

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
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